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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter
is a theoretical work on earnings and wealth inequality, the second chap-
ter is a documentation of earnings, income, and wealth distributions in
China, and the last chapter focuses on housing asset, which is an impor-
tant component of household wealth.1
The first chapter studies the consequences of redistributions inwealth
and earnings inequality when human capital is endogenous and the hu-
man capital risk exists. Becker and Tomes (1979) show the possibility of
a disequalizing effect of redistribution of wealth and income in the long-
run, and Davies (1986) confirms this finding later in a rigorous study.
The above result could be altered if we consider an endogenized human
capital. The theoretical framework is built upon an overlapping gener-
ations model in which an idiosyncratic shock affects human capital for-
mation. To see the effectiveness of the prevalent taxation system in terms
of inequality mitigation through redistribution, I introduce gift-bequest
tax, capital income tax, and labor income tax into the model. Using a
general equilibrium approach, I am able to trace the impacts of differ-
ent redistributions on wealth and earnings inequality. In particular, such
impacts can be further categorized into three channels, i.e. lag structure
effect, transfer effect, and general equilibrium effect, and these three ef-
fects maymove diversely in response to a change in tax rate. Simulations
show that redistribution of earnings may lead to an increase in earnings
1The second chapter is co-authored with Professor Jijun Tan and Dr. Shenghao Zhu,
while the third chapter is co-authored with Dr. Yang Tang and Dr. Shenghao Zhu.
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inequality, and redistributions of bequest and capital incomemay reduce
wealth and earnings inequalities.
In the second chapter, I use 2011 China Household Finance Survey
(CHFS) data to describe inequalities of earnings, income, and wealth in
China. I find high inequalities of labor earnings, income, and wealth in
China. Wealth is themost unequally distributed variable among Chinese
households. Business income comprises a large share of income among
top groups. I also investigate inequality along dimensions of age, em-
ployment status, education level, marital status of the heads of Chinese
households. In particular, I find that the households with young heads
tend to be rich in earnings and income, and their income is largely gen-
erated from business.
In the third chapter, I propose a rational bubble story to explain the
rising housing price dispersion in the United States from 1975 to 2007.
The mechanism is motivated by the empirical test that the panel of hous-
ing price-to-rent ratio contains a unit root. I have also carefully examined
several alternative competing mechanisms using relevant data, and ar-
gued that none of them can give rise to the similar magnitude of hous-
ing price dispersion growth as in the data. I then set up a parsimonious
asset-pricing islandmodel with rational bubbles, and calibrate themodel
to U.S. economy. The model can successfully match the growth trend
of both housing price level and its coefficient variation, together with
a moderate growth trend of rental price level and its coefficient varia-
tion. To isolate the role of rational bubble, I have also simulated the se-
ries of pure rents and fundamental housing price separately. The results
suggest that rational bubble is the main driving force of housing price
ix
dispersion. Several robustness check are offered. I also provide an ex-
tension of the benchmark model, where I create a sunspot event and the
scenario of housing market crash will arise as the equilibrium outcome.
x
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Chapter 1
Human Capital Risk and
Inequality
1.1 Introduction
The inequality issue has been increasingly receiving attention from the
public, the political leaders, and the academy. Putting aside the contro-
versial role that inequality plays in economic growth, inequality brings
overwhelmingly negative impacts. It creates social tension rooted in the
feelings of injustice of the bottom group of the distribution; it can un-
dermine the democratic system through an over-representation of the
wealthy class. Redistributions are widely accepted policies to correct
inequality. The social security system, social insurance, and public ed-
ucation are several examples of redistribution. Such policies are often
financed and sustained by tax revenue. One may easily question the ef-
fectiveness of these tax-financed redistribution policies in terms of their
performance in achieving inequality reduction targets. To propose sensi-
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ble solutions to inequality mitigation, one must possess an understand-
ing about the generation and evolution of inequality, as well as mecha-
nisms through which taxation could affect inequality.
Despite that a comprehensive tax system including income taxes and
bequest taxes is popular across countries, very few studies have attempted
a complete analysis of the distributional effects of such taxes. As we are
going to show, distributional effects of a typical tax include three chan-
nels, namely the lag structure effect, the transfer effect, and the general
equilibrium effect.
We investigate the impacts of different types of taxes on wealth and
earnings inequality when human capital risk presents. We introduce
an overlapping generations (OLG) model, in which agents can live for
three periods: childhood, young adulthood, and old age. Young adults
consume, supply their efficient labor inelastically, save, and invest in
children’s education. Old parents consume their savings and have "joy-
of-giving" bequest motives. The government collects gift-bequest tax,
labor income tax, and capital income tax and redistributes the revenue
equally to children in the form of public schooling. A competitive firm
exists in the economy to hire efficient labor and to absorb savings from
households for production. A government levies taxes on gift-bequests,
labor income, and capital income, which is also the interest payment
from household savings. Tax revenues are redistributed as a lump sum
to each child in the form of public education.
My model is highly tractable. In a simple overlapping generations
setup, we can represent the intergenerational evolution of wealth and
earnings recursively from previous generation(s). We can conveniently
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trace three possible channels of taxation’s impacts on wealth and earn-
ings distribution. "Lag structure effect" exists in the autocorrelation of
wealth and earnings, "transfer effect" refers to lump-sum transfers, and
"general equilibrium effects" functions through the adjustment of equi-
librium interest rate.
Income and wealth distribution with investment risk has been stud-
ied intensively. Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) and Zhu (2013) survey re-
cent literature in wealth distribution with investment risk. But how hu-
man capital risk affects wealth distribution seems to be under-investigated.
In contrast, the relationship between human capital and earnings (hence
also income) inequality has been well explored. According to computa-
tions using 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data, Díaz-Giménez
et al. (2011), investment income (or capital income) only accounts for
slightly more than a tenth of the total household income in the United
States. Labor earnings, however, account for the largest share, 64.3 per-
cent in total income. Labor earnings are also the largest income compo-
nent for both the income-richest and wealth-richest households. Using
the 1969-1992 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Huggett et
al. (2006) find that the heterogeneity in learning ability accounts for the
earnings variations and dynamics in the United States.
This study is greatly inspired by Becker and Tomes (1979), Davies
(1986), and Bossmann et al. (2007). By assuming exogenous human cap-
ital hence exogenous labor earnings, Becker and Tomes (1979) show the
possibility of a disequalizing effect of redistribution on wealth and in-
come in the long-run, and Davies (1986) confirms this finding later in a
rigorous study.
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Davies (1986) shows that the redistribution of earnings leads to a lin-
ear decline in the inequality measure, i.e. coefficient of variation (CV).
The analysis could be very different if we consider an endogenous hu-
man capital. Bossmann et al. (2007) conducts an analysis of the im-
pact of bequest tax on the wealth distribution in a general equilibrium
framework. It shows the possibility of an inequality reducing role of be-
quests because it raises private savings. Bequest tax and redistribution
could further decrease wealth inequality because of the "joy-of-giving"
bequest motives. Wan and Zhu (2013) use the decomposition technique
developed by Davies (1986) to reinvestigate the effects of estate taxes on
wealth inequality in the model of Bossmann et al. (2007).
We follow the human capital formation process by Krebs (2003), which
studies the effect of idiosyncratic labor income risk on aggregate invest-
ment and growth. As a differentiation, the focus of our study is, how-
ever, the wealth and income inequality issue generated by endogenous
human capital with shocks. We will see how an idiosyncratic labor in-
come risk affects wealth and earnings distributions in a simple manner
and how the inequality is transformed from one generation to another.
In terms of modeling techniques, our study differs from some pa-
pers investigating inequality issue with altruism in the objective func-
tion. Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) adopt a model in which utility-
maximizing parents choose optimal investments in the human and non-
human capital of children and other offspring. In the model of Zilcha
(2003), intergenerational transfers of bequests and human capital are also
motivated by altruism. However, the altruistic utility function cannot
generate a stationary distribution of wealth and earnings for our pur-
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pose. One remedy could be adding probabilistic death rates to the altru-
istic model, which results in a greater complexity but not more insights.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we
set up the overlapping generations model formally. Then we proceed to
characterize the dynamic structure of wealth and earnings distributions
in Section 1.3. With simple parameterization, we present a set of sim-
ulation results and discussions in Section 1.4. Finally, we conclude the
study in Section 1.5.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Agent’s Problem
Consider a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model in which
individuals live for three periods. Each household consists of three uni-
sexual members: a child, a parent, and a grandparent. The consump-
tions of children are negligible, and we assume that children make no
decisions but accumulate their human capital. Parents supply their effi-
cient labor (human capital) inelastically and earn labor incomes. Mean-
while, they spend on children’s education and also make consumption
and saving decisions. The elderly grandparents consume their savings
in the form of gross capital returns and give inter-vivo gifts (which also
can be considered as bequests or inheritance) to the young adult once
they reach old age.
Meanwhile in the model, there is a representative firm that produces
an "all-purposes" good at any period t. It employs labor from the cur-
rent young agents, absorbs new household savings in each period, and
5
repays the debt borrowed in the previous period. The consumption and
production relations are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: The Three-period Overlapping Generations Model
A government exists in this economy and adopts a redistribution pol-
icy. It imposes proportional taxes on gift-bequest, labor income, and
capital income, which are denoted as τb, τw, and τr respectively. All
the revenue gt is spent on public education.1
Given these taxes, the net income of a young agent (not the income
of household) from household i in period t is the sum of after-tax gift-
1In response to the debate of equality of opportunity versus equality of outcomes,
such a redistribution scheme ensures equal education opportunity above the basic level
for each individual in their childhood. The redistribution policy that ensures equal re-
sults through the form of lump-sum cash transfer has also been studied in Bossmann
et al. (2007).
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bequest received, and the after-tax labor income is,
qi,t = (1  τb) bi,t + (1  τw)wthi,t, (1.1)
where wt is the market wage rate for each unit of efficient labor, and
bi,t is the before-tax bequest-gift received from the old family member in
period t.
Agents differ in their ability embodied in their human capital. Part of
the human capital is heritable because parents and children share genes.
But such intergenerational transmission of ability cannot perfectly cap-
ture the human capital formation of children. Individuals’ human capi-
tal level is also affected by educational attainment and many individual-
specific factors. We can thus account for these individual-specific factors
by modeling them as a catchall idiosyncratic shock eηi,t+1 to child i in pe-




1  δh + eηi,t+1 ht,i + ei,t + gt. (1.2)
We assume that public education expenditure, gt, and private education
spending, ei,t, are perfectly substitutable in a child’s human capital for-
mation. Compared with Becker and Tomes (1979) and Davies (1986), the
multiplicative human capital shock in this model is a noticeable differ-
ence. The idiosyncratic shock is added to the inheritable human capital
and is passed on from one generation to another.
All households share identical preferences. Parents have the "joy-
of-giving" utility function and care about the gift-bequest size after tax.
Then the problem for an agent in his adulthood at time t can be formally
7





log cyi,t + χ1 log ei,t + β

log coi,t+1 + χ2 log(1  τb)bi,t+1

s.t. cyi,t + ei,t + si,t = qi,t, (1.3)
coi,t+1 + bi,t+1 = [1+ rt+1 (1  τr)] si,t,
qi,t = (1  τb) bi,t + (1  τw)wthi,t,
hi,t+1 =

1  δh + eηi,t+1 ht,i + ei,t + gt,
where cyi,t is the consumption of the agent i born at time t when he is a
young adult, and coi,t+1 is the consumption when he is in his old age in
period t+ 1. Furthermore, si,t is the saving, ei,t is his investment in the
child, and bi,t+1 is the before-tax gift-bequest that he is going to leave to
his child when he is old. χ1 and χ2 are taste parameters for the child’s
education and gift-bequest respectively.
The homothetic preference yields the optimal solution of si,t as a frac-
tion of young agent’s net income,
si,t =
β (1+ χ2)
1+ χ1 + β (1+ χ2)
qi,t = φβ (1+ χ2) qi,t, (1.4)
where φ  11+χ1+β(1+χ2) is the constant. From equation (1.4) we can see
that household savings are directly affected by income taxes in qi,t. Other















[1+ rt+1 (1  τr)]
1+ χ2
si,t.
Substituting the optimal solution of ei,t into equation (1.2), the human
capital generating function can be linked to household savings,
hi,t+1 =

1  δh + eηi,t+1 hi,t + χ1β (1+ χ2) si,t + gt. (1.6)
st in equation (1.4) can be expanded further using the definition of qi,t in
(1.1) and solutions in (1.5),
si,t = φβχ2 (1  τb) [1+ rt (1  τr)] si,t 1
+φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)wthi,t. (1.7)
It shows a linear relationship of intertemporal household saving deci-
sions. Updating the above equation by one period, we have household
savings in period t+ 1 as a function of worker’s human capital,
si,t+1 = φβχ2 (1  τb) [1+ rt+1 (1  τr)] si,t
+φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)wt+1hi,t+1. (1.8)
Then, substituting human capital movement equation hi,t+1 in (1.6), we
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obtain the intergenerational saving dynamics,
si,t+1 = φ [βχ2 (1  τb) [1+ rt+1 (1  τr)] + χ1(1  τw)wt+1] si,t
+φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)
 
1  δh + eηt+1wt+1hi,t
+φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)wt+1gt. (1.9)
This says that household savings can be predicted by previous genera-
tion’s state variables, si,t, hi,t, and gt, and are subject to an idiosyncratic
human capital risk.
Combining equations (1.9) and (1.6), we can obtain household’s sav-












0B@φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)wt+1gt
gt
1CA . (1.10)
If we continue with the recursive substitution in (1.10), we can see that
the wealth holdings (earnings) of a household at any time t are deter-
mined not only by own income, but by a weighted sum of its own and
its ancestors’ income in its lineage.
The absence of other investment opportunities gives us a compact
definition of household wealth, which is simply accumulated savings.
Similarly, because all efficient labor enjoys the same market wage rate in
each period, an individual’s earnings are proportional to his/her human
capital level. Therefore, the distributions of savings and human capital
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levels can perfectly describe the distributions of wealth and earnings in
our model.
The recursive equation system (1.10) shows that the intergenerational
evolution of wealth and earnings. The current generation’s wealth and
earnings are autocorrelated by wealth and earnings of previous genera-
tion(s). The correlations are determined by the three tax rates. In what
follows, we refer to the intergenerational autocorrelation of household
wealth and earnings as the "lag structure effect" of taxes.
1.2.2 Firm’s Problem
There is a representative firm in the production sector that produces an
"all-purposes" good. The firm’s problem is as follows,
max
Kt,Ht
fF(Kt,Ht)  (rt + δk)Kt   wtHtg , (1.11)
where Kt and Ht are aggregate physical capital and aggregate human
capital respectively.
The optimal conditions of the firm’s problem are as follows,
rt + δk = F1 (Kt,Ht) ,
wt = F2 (Kt,Ht) .
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function,




with the capital’s share of production 0 < α < 1. Then
rt = αAKα 1t H
1 α
t   δk
= αAkα 1t   δk, (1.13)








Note that wt is a function of kt and is thus also a function of rt,
wt = (1  α) Akαt ,

















= τbBt + τwwtHt + τrrtSt 1
=





Kt + τwwtHt. (1.16)
The second equality holds by definition, and the third equation holds
after substituting the solution of Bt and St.
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which is constant under the balanced growth path.
1.2.4 General Equilibrium
Further, we assume that there is a unit measure of families so that the
measure in each generation is also in unity. The capital market clearing
condition requires that the total capital demand from firms equal the








di denotes the aggregation of young adults. The efficient la-








di means the aggregation of children. Then, the government
budget balance implies that each child receives the education subsidy
from the government by the exact amount of gt.
Then total capital supply next period, Kt+1, can be found by the ag-
gregation of current individual household savings si,t, i.e. aggregation
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of the equation (1.7),
Kt+1 = φβχ2 (1  τb) [1+ rt (1  τr)]Kt + φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)wtHt.
(1.18)
Aggregating the equation of (1.6) and replacing Kt+1 by the previous






















1  δh + E
 eηt+1oHt + gt (1.19)
Combining the previous two equations into the matrix form, we ob-






















Dividing the equation (1.18) by Kt, we have the gross growth rate of
aggregate physical capital size,
Kt+1
Kt





Similarly, dividing the equation of (1.19) by Ht, and together with the
government budget balanced condition (1.16) we have the gross growth
14
















(1  τw)wt + τwwt +

1  δh + E
 eηt+1 (1.22)
Furthermore, K and H grow at the same rate along the balanced







Let us define capital-efficient labor ratio as kt  KtHt . On the balanced
growth path, we have constant factor prices, r and w, as functions of the
constant capital-efficient labor ratio, k.
By their definition, Γ and k should satisfy the equation system formed
by the two equations (1.21) and (1.22) on the balanced growth path,
8>>>>><>>>>>:


















1  δh + E
 eηt+1 .
Equalizing these two equations above, we can solve the equilibrium
factor prices, r and w, capital-efficient labor ratio k, and growth rate Γ
along the balanced growth path. It can be shown that the equilibrium
interest rate is decreasing in all the three types of tax rates.
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1.3 Wealth and Earnings Distribution
Along the balanced growth path, the aggregate capital and efficient la-
bor stocks are deterministic, but individual households are still facing
idiosyncratic human capital shocks that would affect their rankings in
wealth and earnings distributions. Following the above derivations, we
can find each household’s share of wealth and earnings at time t. To do
this, we can simply divide individual wealth and human capital level by












φβ (1+ χ2) (1  τw)
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where the ratio k and growth factor Γ has been solved in the general
equilibrium. The lag structure in equations (1.24) and (1.25) also show
an intergenerational dependence of each individual household’s wealth
and earnings shares.
Combining both equations above, we have each individual house-
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This equation system builds the foundation to definemeasures of wealth
and earnings inequality. It is also the key to characterization of wealth
and earnings stationary distributions.
Here, we adopt the Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality.2 The
Gini coefficient is defined based on the Lorenz Curve.
Definition 1.1 Let X be the wealth (earnings) and FX(x) be the cumulative






F  X (t)dt, p 2 [0, 1],
where F  X (t) = inf fx 2 [0,+∞) : FX  tg.3





which is two times the shaded area in the following diagram.
2Alternatively, one may use other inequality measures, such as coefficient of varia-
tion, top income share, ratio of top 90th to 10th percentile, etc.
3See Gastwirth (1971) for the details in the definition.
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Figure 1.2: Definition of Gini coefficient
1.3.1 Existence of Stationary Distribution
Along the balanced growth path, the ranking of individual households
in the wealth and earnings distributions may change due to different
realization of human capital risk, despite that the aggregate capital and
efficient labor stocks could be deterministic. This possibility leads us to






1CA; then equation (1.26) can be rewritten as a
multidimensional random difference equation,
Xt+1 = eρt+1Xt + ξ, t > 1, (1.27)
where
eρt+1 =





1  δh + eηt+1
1CA
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Proposition 1.1 Equation (1.27) has a unique stationary solution.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Based on these results, we could proceed to simulation to study the
pattern of distribution change in response to changes of various tax rates.
1.4 Simulation
1.4.1 Dynamic Simplification
The equation system in (1.27) shows a dynamic movement of wealth and
earnings. However, the conventional inequality indicators measure in-
equality on a cross-sectional or static basis. According to the study of
Sun (2006), it can be shown that dynamic and static distributions among
a large population of randomly interacting agents are equivalent. In
other words, long-run distributions for a lineage coincide with cross-
section distributions for all households. This finding helps us simulate
the cross-sectional distribution equivalently by a historical distribution
of a representative households at all dates, as long as the population
is large enough. Results for cross-sectional distributions of wealth and
earnings follow immediately from individual lineage’s historical varia-
tions of wealth and earnings.
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1.4.2 Calibration
Suppose each generation spans 20 years. The capital share of national
income for the United States in the post-war period has an average of
about 36%. We thus calibrate α as 0.36. The period discount rate β is
assumed to be 0.4, which is equivalent to an annualized discounting rate
of 0.955. The aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), A, may affect the
scale but not the distributions of wealth and earnings. Without loss of
generality, A is assumed to be 1 in the simulation.
Following Nadiri and Prucha (1996), the estimate for the annual de-
preciation rate of physical capital in the United States total manufactur-
ing sector is 0.059, or about 0.7 in a 20-year time period. Due to the
lack of a convincing estimate for the human capital depreciation rate,
we assume it to be 0.8, i.e., human capital is obsolete at a slightly faster
pace than physical capital. The idiosyncratic human capital risk ηt is as-
sumed to follow a log-normal distribution, i.e., ηt  logN(µ, σ2), with
E(ηt) = 1, and Var(ηt) = e  1 (or µ = e  0.5, and σ = 1).
To conduct a counterfactual analysis of taxation effects, we start with
the benchmark case in which tax rates are set at the current effective
tax rates in the United States. The benchmark bequest (estate) tax rate,
labor income tax rate, and capital income tax rate are 0.2, 0.28, and 0.15
respectively.4 In addition, we set the private education investment taste,
χ1, and bequest motive, χ2, to be 1. The resulting wealth distribution
in benchmark case well matches the wealth distribution in the United
States.5
4See the report by Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The Estate Tax: Myths and
Realities. February 23, 2009. http://www.cbpp.org/files/estatetaxmyths.pdf
5Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011) use the 2007 Consumer Finance Surveys to compute
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1.4.3 Simulation Example
The counterfactual simulation results are obtained by holding two of the
three benchmark tax rates constant while varying the other rate at a time.
Gini coefficients are computed as a measure of inequality. Figure 1.3
shows the trend of Gini coefficients of wealth, and Figure 1.4 shows the
samemeasure of earnings when three types of taxes are varied. From the
simulation example above, we can see that the change of Gini coefficients
of wealth and earnings follows the similar pattern except at the extreme
value.
Figure 1.3: Gini Coefficients of Wealth
1.4.4 Results Discussion
Several characteristics that are different from existing literature deserve
some attentions. First, redistribution of labor income does not result in
the wealth distribution in the United States. The top 1 percent share of wealth is 33.6
percent, the top 5 percent hold 60.3 percent, the top 10 percent hold 71.4 percent, and
the top 20 percent hold 83.4 percent.
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Figure 1.4: Gini Coefficients of Earnings
a linear change in wealth and earnings inequality. To understand the
mechanism underneath, we can decompose total impacts of labor in-
come tax on inequality into three effects.
Lag structure effect. Recalling the recursive equation system in Propo-
sition 1.1, we observe negative impacts of all types of taxes on the lag
term, eρ. The lag term can be viewed as the influence of previous gen-
erations’ wealth and earnings plus a deterministic component. Taxation
on earnings weakens ancestors’ impact through the lag structure, thus
the current agents’ wealth depends more on their own savings (constant
fraction of income), which is more vulnerable to their human capital risk.
Therefore, labor income tax is disequalizing. With exogenous earnings,
lag structure effect does not exist in Davies (1986).
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Transfer effect. For transfer effect of labor income tax, our analysis is in
line with Davies (1986). Labor income tax positively affects the transfer
in (1.25). Holding other variables constant, higher labor income tax gen-
erates higher government revenue, which implies a higher government
subsidy of public education. It, in turn, produces higher human capital
stocks, which are favorable to all workers’ earnings. Under the trans-
fer effect, earnings tax is equality reducing simply because this simple
redistribution reduces the earnings variation across the entire working
population.
General equilibrium effect. The equilibrium interest rate is decreas-
ing in all tax rates. In particular, higher labor income earnings tax rate






1 α . The differential between capital return and human
capital return has been enlarged; the overall inequality is therefore greater.6
Notice that labor income tax increases wealth and earnings inequality
through both lag structure effect and general equilibrium effect but re-
duces both inequalities through transfer effect. So, the net effect of labor
income tax on inequality shall be determined by the relative magnitudes
of the three effects. The U-shape of the inequality measure implies that
the transfer effect is stronger when the tax rate is low, but the other two
factors dominate when the rate becomes high enough. This finding is
different from Davies (1986) in which redistribution of earnings always
results in a linear decline of the equilibrium inequality level.7 Davies
6In addition, the lower equilibrium interest rate lowers the lag term and the transfer
term in (1.27) if holding other variables constant. The weaker lag structure effect and
transfer effect have opposite implications for inequality response.
7Davies (1986) uses coefficient of variation (CV) as the measure of inequality.
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(1986) reaches this conclusion by assumptions of exogenous wage and
price levels, which essentially shut down the lag structure and general
equilibrium channels in our analysis.
Second, redistributions of bequests and capital income have equaliz-
ing effect on wealth and earnings in our simulation. In contrast, Davies
(1986) conclude that inheritance tax augments inequality mainly due to
the breakdown of lag structure. Referring to the decomposition of redis-
tribution of earnings, we can conduct the three-channel analysis for be-
quest tax likewise. The general decline of wealth and earnings inequality
of the redistribution can be due to the dominating role of the transfer ef-
fect. Although higher taxes discourage parents from investing on their
children’s education due to lower after-tax rates of return, a large pub-
lic education subsidy may well revert this reduction. The transfer effect
from bequest tax can be so strong that it may even alter the sum of lag
structure effect and general equilibrium effect.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the distributional effects of three types of
taxes in an OLGmodel in which old parents have "joy-of-giving" bequest
motives. Although we study only one cause of inequality generator- the
risk from human capital, it yields fruitful results under a general equi-
librium framework. The human capital risk is modeled as an idiosyn-
cratic shock in the inter-generational transmission of human capital. It
creates dispersion in labor earnings directly, and in turn affects individ-
ual’s consumption-savings decisions, educational investment, and be-
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quest size. Using a tractable setting in our model, inequality of wealth
and earnings can be measured as the inequality of savings and human
capital directly.
Adoption of tax matters in determining the distributions after redis-
tribution. We looked three popular taxes in the model, namely the gift-
bequest tax, labor income tax, and capital income tax. They influence in-
equality through three divergent channels: lag structure, transfers, and
general equilibrium effects. The net effect of a specific tax on inequality is
determined by the relative magnitudes of these three effects at different
taxation level. By varying one tax rate while fixing the other two at their
prevalent levels, we find that earnings inequality is particularly sensi-
tive to the relative strength of the three effects. Different from Becker
and Tomes (1979) and Davies (1986), redistributions of bequests and cap-
ital income reduce wealth and earnings inequality in our model. This is
due to the dominating transfer effect in redistributions with endogenous
human capital.
As we demonstrate in the simulation, labor income tax rate is not
monotonically associated with the inequality level. However, we do not
attempt to find the social optimal taxation rates in this chapter. A possi-
ble extension could be made along this direction. For further investiga-




Earnings, Income, and Wealth
Distributions in China: Facts
from the 2011 China Household
Finance Survey
2.1 Introduction
Rapid economic growth of China in recent years causes many concerns
of inequality. Many studies have documented inequality of earnings, in-
come or wealth separately. For example, Li and Sicular (2014) use data
from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the China Household
Income Project (CHIP) to compute income inequality measures between
mid-1990s and 2008. Xie and Zhou (2014) summarize Gini coefficients
of income in China from multiple data sources. Ding and He (2015)
conduct the first empirical study of earnings, income, and consumption
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inequality in urban China from 1986 to 2009 using Urban Household
Survey (UHS) data. For wealth inequality, Zhao and Ding (2010) also
adopt CHIP survey data in 2002 to compute urban, rural, and national
wealth inequality measures. While Meng (2007) focuses on the wealth
inequality in urban China using the Urban Household Income Distribu-
tion Surveys for the years 1995, 1999, and 2002. Xie and Jin (2015) also
find a high concentration of wealth in China using China Family Panel
Studies (CFPS) data in 2012. However, none of these studies has investi-
gated earnings, income, and wealth inequality in China simultaneously
by using one dataset. In this chapter, we have the first attempt to report
comprehensive facts on distributions of earnings, income, and wealth in
China using a single household survey dataset- the 2011 China House-
hold Finance Survey (CHFS).1
We adopt the approaches of Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997), Budría et al.
(2002), and Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011), to define earnings, income, and
wealth.2 Earnings are the rewards to all types of labor including entre-
preneurial labor. Income is defined as revenue from all sources before
taxes but after transfers. Wealth is defined as the net worth of the house-
hold.3 Because of the differences between the institutions in China and
the United States, we slightly modify the above definitions of earnings,
income, and wealth in accordance with the context in China.4
Using 2011 CHFS data, we find high inequalities of labor earnings,
income, and wealth in China. Wealth is the most unequally distrib-
uted variable among the three across Chinese households. We find that
1For more information about CHFS data, see Appendix B.1.
2Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997) discuss the multidemensional nature of inequality.
3Note that earnings and income are flow variables while wealth is a stock variable.
4For detailed definitions of earnings, income, and wealth, see Appendix B.2.
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the top 1 percent households in each distribution account for 22.09 per-
cent, 23.76 percent, and 24.25 percent of earnings, income, and wealth in
China.
We also find that the business income comprises a large share of in-
come among the rich. For the top 1 percent income-rich households in
China, business income accounts for 59.08 percent of total income, while
labor income and capital income account for smaller shares of 21.35 per-
cent and 9.83 percent respectively (See Table 2.7 in Section 2.3.4). This
finding is especially interesting when we compare it with the income
source of the top income group in the United States. Labor income is the
largest part of total income for the top 1 percent households in 2007 in
the United States (See Table 5 in Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011)).
We then investigate inequality along dimensions of age, employment
status, education level, marital status of the heads of Chinese house-
holds. In particular, we find that the households with young heads tend
to be rich in earnings and income, and their income is largely gener-
ated from businesses. On top of the above four dimensions, we incor-
porate the households characteristics distinctive in China, namely the
rural-urban residence, and the regional differences. We find high in-
equalities between rural and urban areas and high inequalities among
regions. However, the distributions within each residence group and
each region are also highly skewed.
Our dataset allows us to report the accurate information about the
top shares of incomes in China. Piketty and Saez (2003) find a U-shape
of the top 1% income share in the United States during the twentieth
century. Similar to Piketty and Saez (2003), we find the fat tail of the
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income distribution. While Piketty and Saez (2003) use tabulations of
tax returns data to estimate top income shares, we use household survey
data to calculate top income shares.
The structure of the ChinaHousehold Finance Survey (CHFS) is simi-
lar to that in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in the United States.
We can conduct reasonable comparisons between China and the United
States. We find that both countries have high inequalities and sources
of income disparities within top-rich groups are different for two coun-
tries.5
Several other features of the CHFS dataset deserve highlights. First,
the CHFS dataset has detailed information about household assets in
China. Secondly, the CHFS data oversamples the rich through oversam-
pling communities with high housing prices. Thirdly, the uncensored
dataset that we use in this study allows us to have more accurate in-
formation about the net worth of top-rich households and to avoid the
top-coding problem in many other surveys.
We also investigate earnings, income, and wealth inequality in China
using 2013 CHFS data. Sample sizes of 2011 and 2013 waves are 8, 438
and 28, 141 households respectively. Although the 2013 sample is much
larger, computational results from these two waves are similar.6 Thus,
we only report results from the 2011wave of CHFS sample. Note that the
2011 wave surveys earnings and income information for the year 2010.
We exclude 153 households with negative earnings and the wealthiest
5Using SCF data Bricker et al. (2012) present changes of household income and
wealth from 2007 to 2010 in the United States.
6The CHFS dataset is an unbalanced panel. The 2013 wave includes most of the
households in the 2011 wave.
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household from 2011 CHFS data.7 Therefore, we have 8, 284 households
in the remaining sample. The basic unit in our distribution is household,
while Piketty and Saez (2003) use tax units to study the income inequal-
ity in the United States.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we
present the basic facts of earnings, income, and wealth distributions. We
investigate the poor and the rich of each distribution in Section 2.3. In
Section 2.4 we show the inequality along different dimensions of house-
holds characteristics, such as age, employment status, education, marital
status of the heads of households, and rural-urban residence, and geo-
graphic regions of households. Finally, we briefly discuss our findings
in Section 2.5.
2.2 Earnings, Income, and Wealth Inequality
Wefind high inequalities of labor earnings, income, andwealth in China.
Wealth is themost unequally distributed variable among Chinese house-
holds. We observe a rightward skewness of all the distributions. We
show that earnings and income are highly correlated, but none of them
is significantly correlated with wealth.
2.2.1 Ranges and Histograms
The distributions of earnings, income, andwealth differ greatly in ranges
relative to their own averages, as shown in Table 2.1. Earnings range
from zero times to 109.55 times of the average earnings, incomes range
7The dropped the wealthiest household has a net worth over 1 billion RMB, but this
observation has many missing values of other variables about household information.
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from  0.70 times to 124.89 times of the average income, and wealth
ranges from  197.62 times to 294.16 times of the average wealth.8,9
Table 2.1: Mean, Median, and Normalized Ranges
Variable Mean Median Normalized	Minimum* Normalized	Maximum*
Earnings 40,394 16,904 0.00 109.55Income 60,053 28,312 -0.70 124.89Wealth 687,061 197,150 -197.62 294.16
*Notes:	Data	are	normalized	by	sample	averages.
Four panels in Figure 2.1 are the histograms of all earnings, nonzero
earnings, income, and wealth. To compare these variables on the same
basis, all values have been normalized by their corresponding means,
8In our sample of 8, 284 households, there are 31 households with wealth aboveU10
million. The four wealthiest households, whose wealth levels are above U50 million,
have net worth ofU54.76million, U66.18million,U106.76million, andU202.11million
respectively. In what follows, we use the symbol U to denote the monetary unit of the
RMB yuan.
9The ratio of private wealth to income in 2011 CHFS is 11.44. Xie and Jin (2015),
using 2012 CFPS data, find that this ratio is 9.2, which is close to our number. Piketty
and Zucman (2014) report the long-run national wealth-national income ratio in rich
countries. In 2010, national wealth-national income ratios for the United States and Eu-
ropean countries (weighted) are 4.31 and 5.30 respectively. Note that national wealth
includes private wealth and public wealth. Although public wealth accounts for negli-
gible shares of national wealth in the United States and European countries, we believe
that it accounts for a significant share of national wealth in China. Even though we
did not find the share of public capital in national wealth in China, we find that 8.56
percent of employment is in the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in 2010 (For detailed
statistics, see Table 4-1 in the China Statistical Yearbook 2011).
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and the representation of frequencies only includes the observations greater
than  2 times and less than 10 times the corresponding average. In the
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Figure 2.1: Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth
2.2.2 Concentration
In Table 2.2, we report the Gini coefficient, the coefficient of variation,
ratios of the shares earned or owned by the top 1 percent to the bottom
40 percent, and ratios of the 99th percentile to the 40th percentile in earn-
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ings, income, and wealth distributions.10
Gini coefficients of earnings, income, and wealth are 0.710, 0.664, and
0.761 respectively. These statistics imply high inequalities of labor earn-
ings, income, and wealth in China. The coefficients of variation of earn-
ings, income, and wealth are 2.94, 3.20, and 4.54. The Gini coefficient
and the coefficient of variation show that wealth is the most unequally
distributed variable.
Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011), using 2007 SCF data, find that Gini coef-
ficients of earnings, income, and wealth are 0.64, 0.58, and 0.82 respec-
tively in the United States. Coefficients of variation of earnings, income,
and wealth are 3.60, 4.32, and 6.02 respectively. Looking at the Gini co-
efficient, we find that China has higher inequality in earnings and in-
come, and lower inequality in wealth than the United States. However,
in terms of the coefficient of variation, China has lower inequality in all
three variables than the United States.
We can investigate inequalities through the ratio of the share held by
the top 1 percent households to that of the bottom 40 percent households.
The earnings of the top 1 percent households is 10.71 times that of the
bottom 40 percent households. The income of the top 1 percent house-
holds is 4.47 times that of the bottom 40 percent households. The top
1 percent households of the wealth distribution hold wealth 9.45 times
that of the bottom 40 percent households.
In Table 2.2, we also look at ratios of the 99th percentile to the 40th
percentile in earnings, income, and wealth distributions. Earnings are
10We choose the bottom 40 percent to compare with the top 1 percent in the last two
statistics because it is the smallest group that holds positive shares of earnings, income,
and wealth.
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more concentrated than income. In the earnings distribution, a house-
hold at the 99th percentile earns 44.06 times that of a household at the
40th percentile. This ratio reduces to 25.07 in the income distribution.
Transfer payments and social security income, which are parts of in-
come, account for this reduction. A household at the 99th percentile
of the wealth distribution holds wealth 53.13 times that of the one at the
40th percentile.
Table 2.2: Concentration
Variable Gini	Index Coefficient	of	Variation Top	1%	to	Bottom	40%	Ratio 99th	to	40th	Percentile	Ratio
Earnings 0.710 2.94 10.71 44.06Income 0.664 3.20 4.47 25.07Wealth 0.761 4.54 9.45 53.13
We draw the Lorenz curves for earnings, income, and wealth in Fig-
ure 2.2. Lorenz curves also show high inequalities of labor earnings,
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Figure 2.2: The Lorenz Curves for Distributions of Earnings, Income,
and Wealth
2.2.3 Skewness
We report several skewness measures of earnings, income, and wealth in
Table 2.3. Table 2.3 shows that means locate at percentiles much higher
thanmedians. The ratios of correspondingmean tomedian are all greater
than 1. And the direct skewness measures are positive and large. All
these facts confirm the rightward skewness of these distributions.11 Wealth
is the most skewed variable among the three, and income is the least
skewed.
11In a symmetric distribution, the mean should locate at the 50th percentile, and the
ratio of the mean to the median should therefore be 1.
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Table 2.3: Skewness
Variable Location	of	Mean(Percentile) Ratio	of	Mean	to	Median Skewness*
Earnings 74 2.39	 15.68Income 77 2.12	 17.74Wealth 80 3.48	 33.83
*Notes:	The	skewness	of	a	random	variable	is	the	third	standardized	moment.
2.2.4 Correlation
We show the correlation coefficients between earnings, income, andwealth
in Table 2.4. Computations show that earnings, income, and wealth are
positively correlated. The correlation between earnings and income is
as high as 0.921. This is largely because labor earnings account for 67.26
percent of household income.
The correlation between earnings andwealth is 0.322. The correlation
between income andwealth is 0.339. Both figures are relatively low. This
is due to the low earnings and income reported by several households
with extremely high wealth. If we drop the two households with wealth
greater than U100 million, the correlation between earnings and wealth







In Table 2.5, we present the correlations between earnings, income,
and wealth and the various sources of income. The correlation between
business income and total income is 0.850. However, total income is
moderately correlated with labor income (0.421) andwith capital income
(0.367).
The low correlation between wealth and sources of income is due
to low income of several households with extremely high wealth. The
correlations between total wealth and labor income, capital income, and
business income are 0.142, 0.111, and 0.302 respectively. After we drop
the householdswithwealth greater thanU100million, these figures raise
sharply to 0.237, 0.181, and 0.490 respectively.
12The low correlation between earnings and wealth is not mainly due to retirees. Af-
ter we exclude 1, 258 households with retired heads, the correlation between earnings
and wealth rises slightly to 0.410.
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Table 2.5: Correlation between Earnings, Income, and Wealth and
Various Sources of Income
Labor	Income Capital	Income Business	Income Transfers Other	Income
Earnings 0.626 0.168 0.789 -0.008 0.007Income 0.421 0.367 0.850 0.110 0.240Wealth 0.142 0.111 0.302 0.111 0.015
CorrelationVariable
2.3 The Poor and the Rich
Following Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997), Budría et al. (2002), and Díaz-
Giménez et al. (2011), we distinguish between rich and poor in terms of
earnings, income, and wealth. In particular, we refer to the poorest as
the bottom 1 percent, the poor as the bottom 20 percent, the rich as the
top 20 percent, and the richest as the top 1 percent of each distribution.
For each of the four groups: the poor, the poorest, the rich, and the
richest, we calculate the means of earnings, income, and wealth in that
group relative to the means of the whole sample. We report these facts
in Figure 2.3. The four panels in Figure 2.3 illustrate that the poor in one
variable are not necessarily poor in others. But the rich in one variable
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tend to be rich in others.
We find that the business income comprises large shares of income
among the earnings-richest, the income-richest, and the wealth-richest.
Among the top 1 percent households in partitions of earnings, income,
and wealth, business income accounts for 59.75 percent, 59.08 percent,
and 72.92 percent respectively.
We report the detailed statistics of earnings, income, and wealth par-
titions in Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. These tables also contain the informa-
tion about joint distributions of earnings, income, and wealth.
2.3.1 The Earnings-Poor
A significant share of households has zero or negative earnings. In the
2011 CHFS sample adjusted for weights, around 15.23 percent of house-
holds have zero earnings. Households with retired heads account for
44.42 percent of zero-earnings households. Our definition of earnings
includes all wages and salaries plus a fraction of business income (for
entrepreneurial labor). We calibrate from Li (2012) the fraction of labor
earnings out of income from farm sources as 84 percent and that of labor
earnings out of income from business sources as 59 percent.13
The earnings-poor are likely to be income-poor but wealth-rich. The
lowest quintile of earnings distribution is has a small share of earnings
13Zhang and Xu (2009) assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and estimate
time-varying aggregate labor income shares for China. Adopting various estimation
strategies, they find that the means of estimates between 1979 and 2005 range from
0.36 to 0.39. These estimates are too low compared with adjusted labor income shares






























Figure 2.3: Average Earnings, Income, and Wealth of the Poor and the
Rich
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Table 2.6: Households Ranked by Earnings
1% 1-5% 5-10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95% 95-99% 99-100%
Minimum	Earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 9.00 25.20 49.37 80.20 137.54 396.53 0.00Maximum	Earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 9.00 25.20 49.30 4,425.00 137.51 391.40 4,425.00 4,425.00
Average	Earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 4.07 17.02 36.06 144.66 105.01 214.90 869.77 40.39Average	Income -0.42 0.58 10.56 24.75 11.50 25.75 46.51 192.04 127.48 263.93 1,281.74 60.05Average	Wealth 54.47 309.66 408.89 640.00 397.17 357.80 470.70 1,543.59 1,198.34 2,348.63 7,715.78 687.06
Earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 2.01 8.42 17.88 71.63 13.27 21.16 22.09 100.00Income -0.01 0.04 0.88 8.12 3.83 8.57 15.51 63.97 10.83 17.48 21.89 100.00Wealth 0.08 1.80 2.98 19.37 11.55 10.41 13.72 44.94 8.90 13.59 11.52 100.00
Labor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 8.55 45.55 62.80 56.03 72.56 70.10 32.61 49.82Capital 103.45 18.23 12.87 19.22 12.64 6.71 4.22 6.45 7.20 6.86 6.80 7.40Business 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 33.30 27.75 20.85 31.98 15.53 18.73 59.75 27.38Transfers -3.45 80.43 86.04 73.39 39.71 13.39 10.05 3.36 3.61 2.35 0.82 12.34Other 0.00 1.33 1.09 6.91 5.79 6.61 2.08 2.17 1.10 1.97 0.02 3.06
Average	Age	(years) 48.8 52.9 57.1 59.0 53.1 46.9 45.3 41.6 40.6 37.6 38.0 49.230	and	Under 11.63 9.99 5.60 4.84 3.83 8.78 11.36 18.34 19.40 28.73 25.29 9.4331-45 34.43 28.15 17.18 15.74 26.63 37.49 40.15 43.39 48.49 47.65 57.33 32.6846-65 36.03 34.38 43.69 41.91 50.81 48.45 44.89 36.48 30.70 23.34 17.38 44.51Over	65 17.91 27.49 33.52 37.51 18.74 5.27 3.60 1.80 1.41 0.28 0.00 13.38
Workers 11.69 9.03 5.15 5.25 11.40 32.39 43.73 64.03 73.09 77.55 62.43 31.37Farmers 9.38 10.21 6.01 12.61 62.86 34.80 22.63 8.18 3.65 1.21 0.69 28.21Self-employed 11.71 21.61 9.94 9.15 10.45 16.25 17.75 18.11 14.25 14.96 27.80 14.34Unemployed 32.09 11.40 13.23 9.37 1.40 4.02 2.40 0.98 1.12 0.16 0.00 3.63Retired 7.55 8.77 36.63 41.09 7.79 4.34 7.64 4.45 4.04 1.07 4.14 13.06Nonworkers 27.58 38.97 29.05 22.53 6.10 8.19 5.86 4.26 3.84 5.05 4.93 9.39
Primary	School	&	Below 42.18 48.24 40.44 39.82 52.64 37.87 26.88 13.29 8.50 4.29 0.00 34.09Secondary	&	High	School 44.26 41.71 48.99 42.51 42.28 52.44 53.42 38.96 42.05 16.75 10.82 45.93Diploma	&	College 10.57 5.42 6.17 11.08 2.80 6.94 13.77 22.30 26.82 22.88 23.48 11.38Bachelor	Degree	&	Above 1.65 3.82 2.07 5.10 1.17 2.18 5.44 24.90 22.00 54.98 64.78 7.76
Married 62.41 73.31 69.60 75.54 88.19 88.68 90.08 88.79 90.19 86.63 78.42 86.26Single 37.59 26.69 30.40 24.46 11.81 11.32 9.92 11.21 9.81 13.37 21.58 13.74
Rural 30.91 36.64 22.58 28.70 71.32 59.06 43.72 24.15 15.81 12.00 17.12 45.39Urban 69.09 63.36 77.42 71.30 28.68 40.94 56.28 75.85 84.19 88.00 82.88 54.61













Table 2.7: Households Ranked by Income
1% 1-5% 5-10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95% 95-99% 99-100%
Minimum	Income -42.28 0.00 1.00 -42.28 6.99 20.45 37.44 67.11 111.84 182.60 512.65 -42.28Maximum	Income 0.00 1.00 2.57 6.97 20.45 37.43 67.10 7,500.00 182.26 508.00 7,500.00 7,500.00
Average	Earnings 0.64 0.12 0.80 1.43 8.55 19.59 35.26 137.07 96.90 215.16 799.94 40.39Average	Income -0.82 0.36 1.82 2.66 13.24 28.38 49.91 205.92 140.42 283.20 1,422.82 60.05Average	Wealth 71.65 300.96 188.33 300.96 259.29 421.09 600.85 1,838.52 1,488.54 2,627.44 8,258.30 687.06
Earnings 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.72 4.23 9.68 17.50 67.87 11.99 21.30 19.86 100.00Income -0.01 0.02 0.15 0.91 4.41 9.44 16.66 68.58 11.69 18.86 23.76 100.00Wealth 0.10 1.75 1.37 9.17 7.55 12.24 17.53 53.52 10.83 15.29 12.05 100.00
Labor -100.74 22.68 7.03 15.87 36.86 54.77 59.39 48.10 60.76 65.90 21.35 49.82Capital 205.04 6.39 8.52 3.11 3.55 4.01 4.12 8.97 10.10 9.12 9.83 7.40Business 37.61 7.43 44.34 44.08 34.45 18.75 15.80 30.70 12.87 16.73 59.08 27.38Transfers -41.90 63.15 39.49 36.19 24.31 21.96 20.30 7.99 14.16 5.43 1.30 12.34Other 0.00 0.35 0.62 0.74 0.83 0.51 0.39 4.23 2.11 2.81 8.44 3.06
Average	Age	(years) 48.9 51.7 57.5 54.1 50.8 48.3 48.2 44.4 45.1 39.1 40.6 49.230	and	Under 9.22 12.16 2.16 5.88 5.50 8.55 9.51 17.72 17.76 23.40 21.14 9.4331-45 37.16 27.11 23.04 26.82 29.45 36.61 33.62 36.91 35.83 50.18 53.02 32.6846-65 35.77 34.33 43.31 41.26 52.37 43.48 47.54 37.88 36.56 24.99 21.02 44.51Over	65 17.85 26.40 31.49 26.04 12.68 11.36 9.33 7.49 9.85 1.43 4.81 13.38
Workers 11.34 10.87 8.24 8.44 21.12 32.75 39.44 55.06 58.85 69.81 41.29 31.37Farmers 9.35 20.87 49.36 47.46 44.09 25.58 18.27 5.68 2.30 1.13 1.29 28.21Self-employed 12.14 20.78 8.01 11.66 10.65 15.56 15.46 18.38 16.56 19.17 39.60 14.34Unemployed 31.99 10.53 3.08 6.25 4.32 3.80 2.47 1.34 0.95 0.21 0.93 3.63Retired 8.16 7.76 5.66 5.42 9.52 16.07 19.13 15.14 15.61 3.99 9.05 13.06Nonworkers 27.02 29.18 25.65 20.77 10.30 6.26 5.22 4.40 5.73 5.70 7.84 9.39
Primary	School	&	Below 41.74 52.18 63.45 57.48 44.14 32.12 25.71 11.04 12.87 4.55 0.84 34.09Secondary	&	High	School 45.22 38.04 32.36 36.66 49.47 54.10 50.70 38.70 34.16 22.01 23.36 45.93Diploma	&	College 9.78 6.10 1.71 3.27 4.22 9.32 15.46 24.61 24.82 24.70 23.34 11.38Bachelor	Degree	&	Above 1.93 3.24 1.69 1.50 0.77 3.96 7.60 24.97 27.22 47.53 51.52 7.76
Married 63.63 77.70 74.06 79.19 86.39 85.61 91.37 88.73 87.69 84.37 82.66 86.26Single 36.37 22.30 25.94 20.81 13.61 14.39 8.63 11.27 12.31 15.63 17.34 13.74
Rural 30.81 41.61 68.64 61.99 62.21 46.32 35.78 20.66 13.74 12.16 15.52 45.39Urban 69.19 58.39 31.36 38.01 37.79 53.68 64.22 79.34 86.26 87.84 84.48 54.61













Table 2.8: Households Ranked by Wealth
1% 1-5% 5-10% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95% 95-99% 99-100%
Minimum	Wealth -135,775.01 -21.10 5.25 -135,775.01 55.28 145.97 279.20 659.60 1,539.16 3,008.62 7,755.00 -135,775.01Maximum	Wealth -21.34 5.20 20.50 55.15 145.90 278.94 659.55 202,105.41 3,006.00 7,638.80 202,105.41 202,105.41
Average	Earnings 74.42 12.57 11.51 13.82 19.81 26.67 36.76 102.66 85.31 126.07 562.5 40.39Average	Income 118.95 24.30 22.93 24.41 27.58 35.91 51.29 159.19 117.92 207.25 923.0 60.05Average	Wealth -646.22 0.55 12.77 -88.31 98.80 202.42 422.20 2,716.05 2,091.74 4,301.17 16,107.6 687.06
Earnings 1.84 1.24 1.43 7.85 9.81 13.16 18.23 50.95 10.53 12.44 14.40 100.00Income 1.98 1.61 1.92 8.65 9.18 11.92 17.10 53.14 9.79 13.76 15.89 100.00Wealth -0.94 0.00 0.09 -0.31 2.88 5.87 12.31 79.25 15.18 24.96 24.25 100.00
Labor 19.0 46.01 43.16 42.81 58.54 60.38 59.17 44.08 61.19 50.99 17.92 49.82Capital 3.34 13.61 6.64 6.44 7.15 2.41 4.21 9.75 7.48 18.62 6.66 7.40Business 72.65 6.93 8.46 27.07 16.95 18.31 18.18 34.22 18.63 16.48 72.92 27.38Transfers 4.98 30.09 19.77 17.61 14.68 13.95 16.47 9.38 11.71 8.12 2.06 12.34Other 0.02 3.36 21.97 6.07 2.68 4.94 1.97 2.57 0.98 5.78 0.46 3.06
Average	Age	(years) 46.0 53.2 52.5 52.9 49.7 48.5 47.4 47.4 46.1 46.4 48.3 49.230	and	Under 15.17 10.41 15.83 10.15 7.96 8.29 9.91 10.84 15.98 7.32 10.83 9.4331-45 27.27 24.32 20.50 23.83 32.13 34.33 36.42 36.69 34.44 43.60 36.40 32.6846-65 54.69 41.41 33.77 42.82 45.33 46.69 45.02 42.69 40.63 42.06 37.75 44.51Over	65 2.88 23.86 29.90 23.21 14.57 10.69 8.66 9.77 8.95 7.02 15.02 13.38
Workers 28.05 17.98 22.19 19.90 25.86 31.38 38.43 41.22 49.70 40.16 35.45 31.37Farmers 21.01 23.79 34.64 37.33 43.89 34.82 19.53 5.57 4.49 3.49 1.47 28.21Self-employed 19.57 4.79 7.31 8.47 9.12 12.43 19.10 22.55 14.79 26.66 34.90 14.34Unemployed 6.04 12.36 3.94 4.95 3.30 3.70 3.59 2.62 2.22 1.25 0.96 3.63Retired 10.12 11.22 11.57 10.97 8.21 9.80 14.08 22.20 22.20 20.60 22.11 13.06Nonworkers 15.22 29.87 20.35 18.37 9.61 7.87 5.27 5.84 6.59 7.84 5.10 9.39
Primary	School	&	Below 35.65 47.72 49.95 51.29 43.55 37.43 24.28 14.00 11.52 13.14 14.09 34.09Secondary	&	High	School 44.87 41.47 38.01 38.93 46.02 49.53 52.81 42.34 41.44 29.78 22.04 45.93Diploma	&	College 9.08 4.25 8.79 5.03 6.64 8.42 15.45 21.32 21.36 24.00 25.40 11.38Bachelor	Degree	&	Above 10.40 4.79 2.17 3.62 2.24 4.28 7.13 21.48 24.89 32.62 35.68 7.76
Married 83.61 66.34 74.86 74.87 87.96 89.11 91.05 88.30 87.14 89.33 76.92 86.26Single 16.39 33.66 25.14 25.13 12.04 10.89 8.95 11.70 12.86 10.67 23.08 13.74
Rural 46.62 44.53 56.49 58.56 62.65 51.54 38.02 16.26 14.18 13.77 5.11 45.39Urban 53.38 55.47 43.51 41.44 37.35 48.46 61.98 83.74 85.82 86.23 94.89 54.61














holdings at 0.05 percent only, and has 8.12 percent of total income.14
However, the households of the bottom earnings quintile have an aver-
age wealth level close to the sample average, and collectively own 19.37
percent of the total wealth. The high wealth level of the bottom earn-
ings quintile is due to several wealthy households who belong to this
group. A household who owned the average wealth of the households
in the bottom earnings quintile would be ranked at 79th percentile of the
wealth distribution (See Tables 2.6 and 2.8).
2.3.2 The Earnings-Rich
The earning-rich tend to be also rich in income and wealth. The top 1
percent earnings-richest households have average earnings, income, and
wealth about 21.53 times, 21.34 times, and 11.23 times that of the sample
averages respectively. Households in the highest earnings quintile have
3.58 times the sample average earnings, 3.20 times the sample average
income, and 2.25 times the sample average wealth.
Households in the highest earnings quintile display clear age pat-
terns. The 31  45 age cohort accounts for 43.39 percent of households
in the quintile. The over 65 age cohort only accounts for 1.80 percent of
households in the quintile.
Households in the highest earnings quintile tend to be highly edu-
cated. Despite of a low sample share of 7.76 percent only, households
with bachelor degree or above account for 24.90 percent of the top quin-
tile and dominantly 64.78 percent of the top 1 percent group.
14Transfers account for 73.93 percent of total income for households in the bottom
earnings quintile (See Table 2.6).
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2.3.3 The Income-Poor
The income-poor tend to be poor in earnings, but not likely to be poor in
wealth. The households in the bottom income quintile hold 0.91 percent
of total income. These households earn only 0.72 percent of total earn-
ings, but they own 9.17 percent of total wealth. A household who owned
the average wealth of the households in the bottom 1  5 percent group
of the income distribution would be in the fourth quintile of the wealth
distribution. And a household who likewise owned the average wealth
of the households in the bottom income quintile would be in the fourth
quintile of the wealth distribution (See Tables 2.7 and 2.8).15
2.3.4 The Income-Rich
The average income of the households in the top 1 percent of the income
distribution is 23.69 times the sample average. And these households
hold 23.76 percent of the total income in the sample. The average income
of the households in the top quintile is 3.43 times the sample average.
The households in the top quintile collectively hold 68.58 percent of the
total income.
The income-rich tend to be rich in both earnings and wealth. The
households in the top 1 percent of the income distribution have average
earnings 19.80 times that of the sample average, and own wealth 12.02
times that of the sample average. The households in the top quintile of
15One may think that the observation that the income-poor is not necessarily poor
in wealth is due to several super-wealthy households in the sample. To see impacts
of these households, we recalculate the wealth of each quintile by excluding the two
households whose wealth exceedU100 million. The average wealth of the lowest quin-
tile becomes U233.36 thousand. This figure is still above the median wealth level,
U197.15 thousand.
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the income distribution on average have earnings 3.39 times that of the
sample average, and own wealth 2.68 times that of the sample average.
Observing the high income inequality in China, we investigate in-
come sources among the rich. Business income comprises the largest
share (59.08 percent) of total income for the top 1 percent households.
Labor income accounts for 21.35 percent of total income in this top group.
Thus, it is entrepreneurship not employment that causes these house-
holds to become rich.
The income source of the top-income group is quite different in the
United States. From Table 5 of Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011), who use 2007
SCF data, we find that labor income is the largest part of total income for
the top 1 percent households in the United States. In the United States,
labor income accounts for 39 percent of income for the top 1 percent
households, while business income accounts for 28.3 percent.
2.3.5 The Wealth-Poor
In the 2011 CHFS sample, 1.78 percent of households have negativewealth,
and 0.09 percent of households have zero wealth. Although the fraction
of zero and negative wealth is small, wealth is more unequally distrib-
uted than earnings and income. The minimum wealth level in this sam-
ple is negative U135.76 million, which reflects a huge debt. The bottom
40 percent households in the wealth distribution collectively own only
2.57 percent of the total wealth.16
Earnings and income are not necessarily low for households with
poor wealth positions. The bottom 1 percent households in the wealth
16Housesholds in the bottom quintile collectively have a negative share of wealth.
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distribution on average earn about 4.40 times as much as the median
earnings of the whole sample, and 4.20 times as much as the median in-
come of the whole sample. In the first quintile of wealth distribution,
a household who had average earnings in this group would be in the
third quintile of earnings distribution. And a household who had an
average income in this group would be in the third quintile of income
distribution.
2.3.6 The Wealth-Rich
The households in the top 1 percent of wealth distribution have wealth
23.44 times the sample average, and collectively own 24.25 percent of the
total wealth. The households in the top quintile of the wealth distribu-
tion own 79.25 percent of the total wealth.
The wealthy households tend to be both earnings-rich and income-
rich. The households in the top quintile of wealth distribution on aver-
age earn 2.54 times the sample average earnings, and collectively hold
50.95 percent of the total earnings in the sample. The households in the
top quintile of wealth distribution have an average income 2.65 times
the sample average, and hold 53.14 percent of the total income in the
sample.
Business income accounts for the largest share of the income of the
wealthy households. For the group of the top 1 percent wealthiest house-
holds, 72.92 percent of the income is from business. This share is still as
large as 34.22 percent for the households in the top quintile of wealth
distribution.
Xie and Jin (2015) use 2012 CFPS data and the 2012 Hurun China
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Rich List to investigate the wealth-rich group in China.17 They employ
two versions of data, adjusted data and unadjusted data, to study the
wealth-rich group. The unadjusted data are from 2012 CFPS data. For
the unadjusted version of data, the households in the top 1 percent of
wealth distribution own 16.1 percent of the total wealth. The adjusted
data are produced by combining 2012 CFPS data and the 2012 Hurun
China Rich List.18 For the adjusted version of data, the households in
the top 1 percent of wealth distribution own 35.3 percent of the total
wealth. We find that top 1 percent wealthy group own 24.25 percent of
the total wealth. This number is higher than that of unadjusted data in
Xie and Jin (2015), but is lower than that of adjusted data in Xie and Jin
(2015).
2.4 Other Dimensions of Inequality
In this section, we investigate the earnings, income, and wealth inequal-
ity along the dimensions of age, employment status, education, marital
status, rural-urban residence, and regions.
Xie and Zhou (2014) examine the contribution of five factors, regions,
the rural-urban divide, education, race/ethnicity, and the family struc-
ture, for income inequality in China. They find that a substantial part
of China’s high income inequality is due to regional disparities and the
17While the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) and the China Household Finance
Survey (CHFS) are mainly for academic uses, the Hurun China Rich List is mainly for
business aims.
18Precisely, to generate the adjusted data, Xie and Jin (2015) use the 2012 Hurun
China Rich List to estimate the Pareto distribution for the wealth of the top 0.1 percent
richest households in the Chinese population. Then they expand the CFPS data with
the sampling weight to represent the remaining 99.9 percent population. Combining
these two parts, they generate adjusted household wealth data.
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rural-urban gap. Specifically, they use the 2010 China Family Panel Stud-
ies (CFPS) to do variance decomposition analyses and find that about
12% of the overall income inequality in China can be attributed to dif-
ferences across provinces. They also find that the rural-urban divide
accounts for more than 10% of the total inequality in China.19,20 Instead
of doing variance decomposition analyses, we use a more intuitive way
to show the within-group and between-group inequality. We calculate
within-group Gini coefficients and ratios of each group average to the
aggregate level. We also investigate income sources of each group.
2.4.1 Age
We divide households in the entire sample into 10 cohorts with a span
of five years in each cohort. Households with heads aged 46   50 ac-
count for the largest share of the 2011 CHFS sample (13.58 percent),
while households with heads aged 25 and under account for the least
share (3.97 percent).21
Panel A of Figure 2.4 shows overall declining trend of average earn-
ings, income, and wealth levels over age groups.22 We find that house-
19After conducting three adjustments Sicular et al. (2007) find that in 2002 the rural-
urban gap contributes about one quarter of income inequality in China.
20Xie and Jin (2015) use the Theil Index to decompose the within-group and between-
group wealth inequality in China. They find that rural-urban differences account for
more than 10.2% of the wealth inequality. And differences across provinces can explain
23.4% of the wealth inequality.
21See Table 9 for the share of each cohort in the 2011 CHFS.
22Average earnings, income, andwealth in the United State exhibit life-cycle patterns
with continuously increasing trends until the retirement age (See Panel A of Figure 2 in
Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011)). However, the generally declining trend in the 2011 CHFS
is not necessarily inconsistent with the life-cycle theory, since it could be explained
by the "cohort effect." China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy
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Table 2.9: Other Dimensions of Inequality of Households
Earnings Income Wealth Earnings Income Wealth Labor Capital Business Transfer Other
25	and	under 98.81 136.75 926.48 0.698 0.712 0.801 44.37 4.21 46.69 3.74 1.00 3.97 2.5526-30 68.67 89.12 628.48 0.588 0.600 0.670 71.55 14.44 8.69 4.19 1.13 5.46 3.3031-35 67.55 91.02 685.16 0.656 0.670 0.803 51.31 6.26 37.85 2.98 1.60 7.57 3.6536-40 62.20 83.79 810.50 0.699 0.707 0.744 52.83 5.32 34.89 3.07 3.89 12.82 3.6841-45 45.30 59.68 657.38 0.642 0.646 0.702 62.05 5.85 20.77 4.05 7.28 12.29 3.7046-50 41.13 57.47 869.02 0.608 0.608 0.764 51.85 7.97 30.48 6.97 2.74 13.58 3.7851-55 33.11 49.99 625.88 0.631 0.585 0.722 53.63 9.15 17.99 14.93 4.31 11.64 3.7456-60 19.52 34.39 462.40 0.610 0.518 0.675 44.03 7.00 16.71 30.84 1.42 11.57 3.7261-65 20.33 41.91 713.74 0.784 0.669 0.798 24.77 4.82 36.92 32.09 1.40 7.72 3.47Over	65 5.96 29.55 597.50 0.823 0.641 0.822 13.81 12.48 8.13 63.03 2.56 13.38 2.60
Workers 71.86 88.88 773.92 0.565 0.579 0.675 74.73 7.43 9.75 4.91 3.17 31.37 3.39Farmers 15.59 20.58 216.78 0.583 0.539 0.606 40.59 2.02 43.60 12.79 1.01 28.21 3.94Self-Employed 59.64 97.08 1,209.57 0.717 0.725 0.798 23.53 6.90 63.64 3.27 2.66 14.34 3.72Unemployed 12.89 25.23 386.09 0.712 0.589 0.703 43.74 12.29 11.40 23.73 8.84 3.63 3.40Retired 14.73 57.33 1,146.07 0.849 0.502 0.741 18.50 10.87 11.73 56.75 2.15 13.06 2.83Nonworkers 26.72 43.02 489.67 0.843 0.806 0.818 41.21 9.13 33.35 9.26 7.05 9.39 2.95
Primary	School	&	Below 16.39 24.65 316.66 0.643 0.577 0.718 47.38 6.16 25.63 19.08 1.75 34.09 3.55Secondary	&	High	School 29.90 47.18 601.23 0.617 0.575 0.742 44.72 7.09 28.49 14.89 4.82 45.93 3.67Diploma	&	College 69.87 108.40 1,169.74 0.636 0.585 0.666 49.34 9.70 25.27 12.76 2.93 11.38 3.04Bachelor	Degree	&	Above 165.73 222.58 2,111.70 0.625 0.615 0.664 57.53 6.81 28.68 5.33 1.65 7.76 2.77
Married 39.96 58.86 692.82 0.688 0.641 0.750 51.83 7.47 24.82 12.49 3.39 86.26 3.68Single 43.10 67.53 650.93 0.826 0.780 0.816 38.82 7.01 41.40 11.51 1.26 13.74 2.24
Rural 24.99 33.46 292.84 0.656 0.624 0.671 49.29 3.01 35.55 10.20 1.96 45.39 3.82Urban 53.20 82.15 1,014.66 0.708 0.644 0.743 50.00 8.89 24.61 13.06 3.44 54.61 3.20












holds with heads aged 25 and below have the highest earnings, income,
and wealth among all cohorts.23 The 26  30 is the second richest age
group in terms of earnings, and the 31   35 is the second richest age
group in terms of income. The second wealthiest age group is in their
middle age, 46  50.
We plot Gini coefficients of earnings, income, and wealth of each co-
hort in panel B of Figure 2.4. Gini coefficients of earnings and income are
moving closely with each other until age 45. After age 55, the inequal-
ity of earnings rises sharply, but income inequality remains moderately
high. High Gini coefficients are found among the young age groups,
mainly due to the concentration of the top wealthy households. The
wealth inequality starts to increase again after the retirement age.
Panel C of Figure 2.4 shows income sources of each age cohort. Busi-
ness income is the largest income share in the 25 and under age group
(46.69 percent). This cohort happens to be the richest age group in the
rank of cohort-average earnings, income, and wealth. These facts im-
ply that the high-income households are very likely headed by young
entrepreneurs.
2.4.2 Employment Status
Wedivide employment status of household heads into six groups, namely
workers, farmers, self-employed, unemployed, retired, and nonwork-
only started in the late 1970s. There were limited jobs in formal sectors for the currently
old generation.
23These households could have members of multiple generations, or young people
who are rural migrant workers. The wealthy young households may also reflect inter-
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Figure 2.4: Households Partitioned by Age
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ers.24 Workers account for 31.37 percent of the 2011 CHFS sample, farm-
ers 28.21 percent, self-employed 14.34 percent, unemployed 3.63 percent,
retired 13.06 percent, and nonworkers 9.39 percent.25
Workers have earnings, income and wealth 77.91 percent, 48.00 per-
cent, and 12.64 percent higher than the sample average respectively. Farm-
ers are the poorest group in both income andwealth. Their average earn-
ings, income, andwealth levels are only 38.59 percent, 34.28 percent, and
31.55 percent of the corresponding sample averages.26 For the retired
group, although they have low earnings, their income are close to the
sample average and their wealth are the second highest, almost compa-
rable to the self-employed group. For the self-employed, their average
income are 1.62 times the sample average and their average wealth are
the highest in the sample at 1.76 times the sample average.
As shown in panel B of Figure 2.5, the Gini coefficients of earnings,
income, and wealth are vastly different across the groups of employ-
ment status. Earnings are the most equally distributed among house-
holds headed by workers, but is most unequally distributed among the
retired. Compared to earnings, income is generally more equal in all
groups except in workers and the self-employed. But there are still large
variations in income among the self-employed and nonworkers. The
Gini coefficients of wealth within these two groups are also higher than
the sample average.
24Since a significant share of the population in China is currently agriculture-based,
we consider farmers as an employment type, and find that they are poor compared
with other groups.
25The group of nonworkers includes households of nonresponses in the employment
status question.
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2.4.3 Education
We divide the education level of Chinese household heads into four
groups: primary school and below, secondary and high school, diploma
and college, and bachelor degree and above. The households of the four
groups account for 34.09 percent, 45.93 percent, 11.38 percent, and 7.76
percent of the total sample respectively.
Panel A of Figure 2.6 compares the normalized earnings, income, and
wealth levels of the four education groups. We find a strong association
between education levels and economic performance. The households
with bachelor degree or above enjoy earnings, income, and wealth 4.10
times, 3.71 times, and 3.07 times the sample averages. For households
with diploma or college degree, these three figures drop significantly to
1.73 times, 1.81 times, and 1.70 times the sample averages. In contrast,
the households with secondary or high school education have earnings
74.03 percent of the sample average, income 78.57 percent of the sample
average, and wealth 87.51 percent of the sample average. Households
with lowest education level are the poorest in all three variables. Their
earnings, income, and wealth are only 40.59 percent, 41.04 percent, and
46.09 percent of the sample averages respectively.
Panel B of Figure 2.6 shows the concentrations of earnings, income,
and wealth within each educational group. We find within-educational-
group Gini coefficients are similar but slightly lower than those of the
entire sample.
Panel C of Figure 2.6 shows a decomposition of income sources for all
education groups. Business income takes a significant and similar share
around 30 percent of the total income across all households regardless
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of education levels. The share of labor income is the highest in the most
educated group, while the share of transfers is decreasing in the educa-
tional attainment.
2.4.4 Marital Status
We have a binary classification of household marital status: married
household and single household. Married households account for 86.26
percent of the 2011 CHFS sample, and single households 13.74 percent.27
Married households enjoy more wealth, but lower earnings and in-
come than single households. The Gini coefficients of earnings, income,
and wealth of married households are very close to but slightly lower
than those of the whole sample. For single households, all three Gini
coefficients are higher than those of the whole sample. Married house-
holds generate income primarily from labor (51.83 percent), while single
households rely more on businesses (41.40 percent).
2.4.5 Rural-Urban Residence
We can distinguish rural and urban households by using the "rural"
dummy in the 2011 CHFS.28 Rural households comprise 45.39 percent
of the sample, while urban households comprise 54.61 percent of the
sample.29
27The proportion of single households in China is notably lower than that in the
United States (41.2 percent in 2007, Díaz-Giménez et al. (2011)).
28For the definition of "rural", the 2011 CHFS follows the State Department rule. The
CHFS distinguishes rural and urban households by the place of residence rather than
the household registration system (i.e. Hukou).
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Figure 2.7: Households Partitioned by Marital Status
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The financial situation of the urban households is considerably better
than that of the rural households. The earnings, income, and wealth lev-
els of urban households are 2.13 times, 2.46 times, and 3.46 times those
of rural households.
Although inequalities are high within both rural and urban house-
holds, the disparities are relatively lower in the rural area. The Gini co-
efficients of wealth in rural and urban households are 0.671 and 0.743
respectively. The Gini coefficients of earnings in rural and urban house-
holds are 0.656 and 0.708 respectively. 30
2.4.6 Regions
We divide the sample into three regions: East China, Middle China, and
West China.31 East China is the largest group and has 53.35 percent of
households in the 2011 CHFS. Middle and West China account for 25.33
percent and 21.32 percent of the sample respectively. Most provinces
in East China are coastal provinces (See footnote 31). According to the
Table 2–14 in China statistical yearbook 2011, the GDP share of East
China, Middle China, and West China among the twenty-five surveyed
provinces in the 2011 CHFS are 58.29 percent, 21.48 percent, and 20.24
percent respectively.
30Compared with rural households, urban households have a larger reduction of
inequality from earnings to income. This fact suggests that there might be a better
redistribution mechanism in the urban area.
31The East Region includes the following provinces and province-level municipali-
ties: Beijing, Guangdong, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and
Zhejiang. The provinces in the Middle Region are Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan,
Jiangxi, and Shanxi. The provinces, province-level municipality and province-level
autonomous region in the West Region include Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou,


























Figure 2.8: Households Partitioned by Rural-urban Residence
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The large differences among regions contribute to the overall inequal-
ities in China. The income ratio of East China to Middle China is 2.51,
and the income ratio of East China to West China is 2.77. The wealth
ratio of East China to Middle China is 4.15, and the wealth ratio of East
China to West China is 4.85.
The inequalities within each region are also high. The Gini coeffi-
cients of wealth in East China, Middle China, and West China are 0.747,
0.549, 0.622 respectively. The wealth inequality in East China is higher
than that in West China, which in turn is greater than that in Middle
China. We observe similar patterns for earnings and income.
2.5 Discussions
We use 2011 CHFS data to examine the inequality situations in China.
Our computations show very unequal distributions of earnings, income,
and wealth among the Chinese households. Furthermore, we find a
large share of business income among the earnings-rich, income-rich,
and wealth-rich. These findings help us to understand the inequality
patterns in China.
We also find that the poor in one variable are not necessarily poor
in others, but the rich in one variable tend to be rich in others. High
earnings, income, and wealth values are more likely to be found among
young households. Along the dimension of employment status, work-
ers are wealth-poor, retirees are wealth-rich, and farmers are the poor-
est while self-employed are the richest in all three variables. We also




























Figure 2.9: Households Partitioned by Region
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rural-urban residence, and regions among the Chinese households.
Further research could be moving towards the dynamics of earnings,
income, and wealth distributions along China’s economic development.
We can also explore the social mobility in China when later waves of
CHFS data are available.
Castaneda et al. (2003) calibrate a theoretical model to explain the
earnings and wealth inequality in the United States. They use idiosyn-
cratic labor efficiency shocks and agents’ optimal choices to match the
earnings and wealth inequality in the United States almost exactly. In
the future, researchers could use the similar modeling technology to ex-
plain the earnings, income, and wealth inequality in China. One aim of
this chapter is to provide the calibration targets of this kind of researches.
A cross-country comparison of wealth compositions might also be
interesting. For example, Wolff (2006) documents the household wealth
composition in the United States using the 2001 SCF. Housing assets,
business equity, and financial and other assets account for 38%, 17.2%,
and 44.8% respectively. However, in 2011 CHFS data housing assets,
business equity, and financial and other assets account for 66.73%, 15.34%,
and 17.93% respectively in China.32 More researches are needed to un-
derstand the difference of wealth compositions between China and the
United States.
Although Xie and Zhou (2014) obtain interesting findings of causes
for high income inequality in China through comparing contemporary
China with the contemporary United States, we propose a cross-country
32We find that the ratio of housing assets to gross assets is 66.73%. This result is
comparable to that of Xie and Jin (2015). They report that the ratio of gross housing
assets to household net worth is 73.9%. Using Table 4 of Xie and Jin (2015), we can
calculate the ratio of housing assets to gross assets, which is 69.5%.
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historical comparison approach. We compare contemporary China with
the United States before 1935, when the social security system was first
introduced in the United States by the Social Security Act (Wolff, 2009).
The top 1 percent income share in 2011 CHFS data is 23.76 percent. From
the World Top Incomes Database of Alvaredo et al. (2015), we find that
the top 1 percent income share in the United States in 1928 is 23.94 per-
cent.33 By this cross-country historical comparison, we find that the top
1 percent income share in China in 2010 is comparable to that in the
United States in 1928.34 In 1928 the social security system was still ab-
sent in the United States. This comparison gives us hints that the high
inequality level in current China is probably due to the ineffectiveness
of redistribution policies in China.35
Many researchers have studied how the taxation system and the so-
cial security system influence income inequality in China. Yang (1999)
finds that urban-biased policies and institutions, including welfare sys-
tems, are responsible for the long-term rural-urban divide and the in-
creases in income inequality in China. Xu et al. (2013) find a lower
average tax rate and hence a lower redistributive function of China’s
income taxation system. Using 1988–2007 CHIP data, Yang et al. (2013)
show a large difference between welfare systems in rural China and ur-
33To construct the World Top Incomes Database, the researchers use tax returns data
in the United States. Since realized capital gains are included in our income definition,
we compare our results to the top 1 percent income share including capital gains. The
top 1 percent income share excluding capital gain is 19.6% in the United States in 1928.
For cross-country studies of long-run top incomes, refer to Atkinson et al. (2011) and
Alvaredo et al. (2013).
34We compare the top 1 percent income shares, instead of Gini coefficients, between
these two countries, since the Gini coefficient of the United States in 1928 is not avail-
able.
35Note that our income definition is income before taxes and after transfers. See the
detailed definition in Appendix B.2.
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ban China. In 2007 the welfare income (including transfers) accounts for
20 percent of total income in urban China, while it accounts for only 2
to 4 percent in rural China. Urban China has a comprehensive social se-
curity system. But the social security system only plays very minimum
roles in rural China. The differentiated social security systems, includ-
ing the pension systems, reduces the redistribution ability of the social
welfare policies. We could have improved equity in China substantially
if there had been a social security system covering the whole country.
Although we propose a possible explanation of high income inequal-
ity in China, we cannot prove that the ineffectiveness of redistribution
policies can really explain the very high income inequality in China. The
primary aim of this chapter is to characterize facts of earnings, income,
and wealth inequality in China simultaneously by using one dataset.
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Chapter 3
The Rising House Price
Dispersion in the United States
during 1975-2007
3.1 Introduction
The housing market in the United States during 1975-2007 is featured by
a rapid growth in the dispersion of housing prices across metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs). Since housing typically takes up a major pro-
portion of household net worth, fluctuations in housing prices can thus
exert significant impacts on the macro-economy.1 Hence, it is important
to understand what drives the rapid rise in the dispersion of housing
prices. In this chapter we attempt to investigate this issue.
In panel (a) of Figure 3.1, we plot the cross-sectional coefficient of
1Wolff (2006), using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), finds that housing
(principal residence and other real estate) accounts for 38% of household asset.
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variation (CV) for housing prices in the United States during 1975-2007.2
Our balanced panel of housing prices contains 81 major MSAs. In panel
(b) of Figure 3.1, we also present the CV of housing prices for an unbal-
anced panel of 330 MSAs. Figure 3.1 shows that there is a rapid increase
in the dispersion of housing prices. The CV of housing prices in 1975 is
0.17, while this number reaches 0.55 in 2007.3
We first examine several intuitively plausible explanations for pat-
terns observed in Figure 3.1. These explanations emphasise the popula-
tion concentration, the divergence in income growth rates across MSAs,
or the divergence in income growth rates of top income groups across
MSAs. Through investigations of these explanations we find that it is
difficult to fully explain the rapid rise in the dispersion of housing prices
during 1975-2007.
We then conduct econometric analyses of panel data. We empirically
show that housing prices are non-stationary. Andwe find that the Log of
house price-to-rent ratios follows a random walk process through panel
unit-root tests.
To investigate further patterns in Figure 3.1 we set up a parsimonious
asset-pricing island model. Each island corresponds to an MSA. We first
study the fundamental solution of the asset pricing model. The funda-
mental housing price can be completely supported by rents. Our calcu-
lations show that the cross-sectional CV of housing prices is larger than
that of housing prices implied by the fundamental solution for each year
during 1975-2007. Housing prices in the United States display excessive
2The coefficient of variation (CV) is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean.
3The CV computed in Figure 3.1 is unweighted. We also compute the weighted CV
using housing units in each MSA as the weight. The pattern does not change.
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Panel A CV: Housing Prices and Rental Prices (Balanced Panel)














Panel B CV: Housing Prices and Rental Prices (Unbalanced Panel)














Figure 3.1: Housing and Rental Price Dispersion
Notes: The left panel is based on data from a balanced panel of 81 MSAs. The right
panel is based on data from an unbalanced panel of 330 MSAs. Housing prices are
deflated by the consumer price index (excluding shelters). The original data source is
Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). See Appendix C.1 for details.
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dispersion. Also we find that the growth in the dispersion of fundamen-
tal housing prices is too slow relative to the pattern in data.
Inspired by our empirical finding that the Log of house price-to-rent
ratios follows a random walk process, we then investigate rational bub-
bles in our asset pricing model. Following Froot and Obstfeld (1991)
and Lansing (2010), we generate bubble components of asset prices in
the Lucas asset-pricing model by removing the transversality condition.
Specifically, the stochastic growth component of the price-to-rent ratio
causes housing price bubbles in ourmodel. Bubble components can only
be supported by speculations. Furthermore, our model can deliver ex-
plicit expressions for both fundamental and bubble components of the
price-to-rent ratio. Our calibrated model with rational bubbles can si-
multaneously match four stylised facts in the United States during 1975-
2007, the rapid growth in the dispersion of housing prices, a moderate
increase in the dispersion of rental prices, the rising mean of housing
prices, and the rising mean of rental prices. The stochastic growth com-
ponent of the price-to-rent ratio in the bubble solution is the key mech-
anism, through which our model could match the rapid growth in the
dispersion of housing prices. We also perform several robustness checks.
Our model still successfully match housing price moments.
One may think that the stochastic growth component of the price-
to-rent ratio eventually leads to explosive dispersion of housing prices.
In an extension, we introduce an extrinsic uncertainty, which represents
the confidence state, into the benchmark model. We construct a sunspot
equilibrium in which bubbles eventually burst in the long-run. But be-
fore bubbles burst, there is a rapid growth in the dispersion of housing
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prices. Thus our paper also contributes to the literature of sunspot equi-
libria and asset pricing.
3.1.1 Related Literature
Our research is mainly related to two strands of literature: the housing
price dispersion and asset bubbles.
VanNieuwerburgh andWeill (2010) develops a dynamic spatial equi-
librium model and calibrate productivity dispersion to match the in-
crease of cross-sectional earnings dispersion across MSAs in the United
States during 1975-2007. They show that the calibrated model can match
the observed 30-year increase of housing price dispersion. Their frame-
work relies on two main mechanisms, the labour mobility in response to
local wage shocks and inelastic housing supply due to regulatory con-
straints. The housing price in Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) is
equal to the expected present value of rents net of depreciation. And
their model predicts that the magnitude of the increase in the disper-
sion of rental prices is similar to that of the increase in the dispersion of
housing prices. However, this prediction is not supported by data.
In panel (a) of Figure 3.2, we plot the CV of housing prices and that
of rental prices in the United States. Our balanced panel of housing
prices contains 81 major MSAs during 1975-2007. But data of rental
prices are only available during 1984-2007. In panel (b) of Figure 3.2,
we also present the CV of housing prices and that of rental prices for
an unbalanced panel of 330 MSAs. Housing prices have much higher
values of the CV than rental prices. This implies that distributions of
housing prices are more dispersed than those of rental prices. Moreover,
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Panel A The CV of Housing Prices and Rental Prices (Balanced Panel)
















Panel B The CV of Housing Prices and Rental Prices (Unbalanced Panel)
















Figure 3.2: Housing Price Dispersion Vs. Rental Price Dispersion
Notes: The left panel is based on data from a balanced panel of 81 MSAs. The right
panel is based on data from an unbalanced panel of 330 MSAs. Both housing prices
and rental prices are deflated by the consumer price index (excluding shelters). The
original data source is Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). See Appendix C.1 for
details.
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the growth of the CV of housing prices is more rapid than that of the CV
of rental prices. The CV of housing prices in 1984 is 1.94 times that of
rental prices, while this number reaches 2.75 in 2007.4
In this chapter, we generate a bubble component of the house price-
to-rent ratio. Our model is able to match the rapid rising dispersion
of housing prices given a moderate increase in the CV of rental prices.
While labour mobility plays a crucial role in Van Nieuwerburgh and
Weill (2010), it is completely prohibited in our island economy. In our
model rational bubbles caused by speculations within each island are
the main driver of the increase in the dispersion of housing prices.
Gyourko et al. (2013) shows that widening housing price dispersion
can be explained by inelastic land supply in some individual preferred
locations combined with an increasing number of high-income house-
holds. Their empirical results show that the "superstar city" mechanism
can capture about two-thirds of the growth of housing price dispersion
across MSAs during 1970-2000. However, their paper does not investi-
gate the dispersion of rental prices, and their structure is not suitable for
further quantitative analyses.
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) generates intrinsic bubble, which only de-
pends on dividends, in an asset-pricingmodel by removing the transver-
sality condition. Intrinsic bubble can cause asset prices to overreact to
changes in fundamentals, and thus can help to explain excess volatil-
ity of stock prices.5 Froot and Obstfeld (1991) assumes that the growth
rate of dividends is independent and identically distributed over time.
4The CV computed in Figure 3.2 is unweighted. We also compute the weighted CV
using housing units in each MSA as the weight. The pattern does not change.
5See LeRoy (2004) for a survey about rational bubbles.
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Lansing (2010) permits autocorrelation of the growth rate of dividends
and generalises the intrinsic rational bubble. He shows that the rational
bubble component of the price-dividend ratio can evolve as a geometric
randomwalk without drift, such that the mean of the bubble growth rate
is zero. Granziera and Kozicki (2015) investigate whether expectations
that are not fully rational can explain the evolution of the housing price
index and the price-to-rent ratio in the United States during 1987-2011.
In terms of the agent’s decision problem, this chapter share the same
framework as Lansing (2010) and Granziera and Kozicki (2015). Simi-
lar to these two papers, ours also makes use of the solution of the asset
price other than the fundamental price itself. However, applications are
different in these three papers. Lansing (2010) uses the model to study
the price-dividend ratio of the stock market in the United States during
1871-2008. Granziera and Kozicki (2015) investigates the housing price
index in the United States. This chapter examines the cross-sectional dis-
persion of house prices. In Granziera andKozicki (2015) the near rational
bubble solution, which produces a stationary price-rent ratio, replicates
the moments of the price-rent ratio well.6 We find that the rational bub-
ble solution, which produces a non-stationary price-rent ratio, generates
the rapid rising dispersion of house prices given a moderate increase of
rental price CV.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Three plausible ex-
planations for rising dispersion of housing prices are examined in Sec-
tion 3.2. Empirical findings of housing prices and price-to-rent ratios are
6The data in Granziera and Kozicki (2015) include the remarkable downturn of the
housing market in the United States after 2007. This could be one of the reasons why a
stationary price-rent ratio fits their data.
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reported in Section 3.3. An asset-pricing island model is presented in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 contains calibration and simulation results. We
extend the benchmark model to allow bubble burst in Section 3.6. Sec-
tion 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Alternative Mechanisms
In this section we examine three possible explanations for Figure 3.1.
Through investigations of these explanations we find that it is difficult
to fully explain the rapid rise in the dispersion of housing prices during
1975-2007.
Explanation 1. The increasing population concentration leads to the rise in the
dispersion of housing prices.
When population distribution becomes more concentrated, demands
for houses are more uneven across MSAs. They could in turn lead to
the rise of the dispersion of housing prices. However, this hypothesis
could not be supported by data. We collect data on populations and
housing units from the decennial census during 1970-2010 in the United
States. When we use the CV to measure the population concentration,
we indeed observe a declining trend in the dispersion of populations.
We also find that the CV of housing units decreases over the period.
The results are robust both in a balanced panel of 81 MSAs and in an
unbalanced panel of 330MSAs. Results are reported in Table 3.1. The CV
of populations steadily decreases from 1.15 (1.94) in 1970 to 0.90 (1.64) in
2010 in our sample of 81 (330) MSAs. Similarly, the CV of housing units
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steadily decreases from 1.20 (2.01) in 1970 to 0.86 (1.56) in 2010 in our
sample of 81 (330) MSAs.
Table 3.1: CV of Population and Housing Units
CV of Population CV of Housing Units
Year 81 MSAs 330 MSAs 81 MSAs 330 MSAs
1970 1.1461 1.9366 1.1991 2.0110
1980 1.0085 1.7452 1.0144 1.7595
1990 0.9605 1.7046 0.9226 1.6586
2000 0.9310 1.6740 0.8825 1.5970
2010 0.9020 1.6357 0.8552 1.5608
Notes: Numbers are from authors’ computations. The original data source is from
Table 24 of 2010 Census of Population and Housing, in Population and Housing Unit
Counts. See Appendix C.1 for more details.
Explanation 2. The divergence in income growth rates across MSAs leads to the
rise in the dispersion of housing prices.
When average incomes in different MSAs increase at different rates,
housing prices could potentially have different growth rates. Thus we
observe a rapid increase in the dispersion of housing price across MSAs.
We use data from Gyourko et al. (2013) to test this mechanism. We
calculate growth rates of the housing price and the average income in
each MSA during 1970-2000. In Table 3.2 we report unweighted means
of these growth rates of superstar MSAs and of non-superstar MSAs.7
Comparing the column of superstar MSAs and that of non-superstar
MSAs, we find that, apparently the moderate difference of growth rates
of average incomes cannot explain the large difference of growth rates of
7Note that Gyourko et al. (2013) use 1990 MSA definition. A MSA is a superstar in
a particular year if its sum of the housing price and quantity growth rates was above
the sample median, and its ratio of price growth rate-to-housing unit growth rate was
in the top decile in 1950 and 1960. A time-invariant superstar status requires a MSA
was a superstar in any two decades between 1970 and 2000. For a detailed definition
of superstar cities, see Gyourko et al. (2013), p.179-180.
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housing prices. Therefore a large proportion of the high growth rate of
the housing price in superstar MSAs is still unexplainable. Thus this hy-
pothesis alone cannot fully explain the rapid increase in the dispersion
of housing prices.
Table 3.2: Growth of House Prices and Mean Family Income, 1970-2000
Superstar MSAs Non-superstar MSAs
Housing Prices 131.80% 63.52%
(0.805) (0.325)
Average Family Incomes 42.51% 32.13%
(0.173) (0.126)
Notes: The numbers are from authors’ own computations. The original data source
is Gyourko et al. (2013), who report housing prices and mean family income across
MSAs between 1970 and 2000. MSA definitions of Gyourko et al. (2013) are based on
1990 boundaries. Terms in parentheses are standard deviations.
Explanation 3. The divergence in income growth rates of top income groups
across MSAs leads to the rise in the dispersion of housing prices.
This hypothesis assumes that rich people tend to own homes rather
than rent them. Therefore the rapid growth of housing prices in some
particular MSAs could potentially be driven by the fast growth of in-
comes of rich people in these MSAs. However, it is difficult for us to test
this hypothesis due to the limited availability of data on local income dis-
tributions. The major challenge is changing boundaries of MSAs in the
United States. To construct income distributions of consistent MSAs, we
need household income information at the county level. The best income
information at the county level is a summary tabulation ofmean incomes
and income shares for five quintile groups from the Census data. How-
ever, incomes in the Census data are suffered from the top-coding prob-
lem, and this leads to the difficulty to estimating top incomes at the MSA
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level.8
3.3 Empirical Findings of Housing Prices and
Price-to-rent Ratios
In this section, we empirically show that housing price processes are
non-stationary. And we find that the Log of house price-to-rent ratios
follows a random walk process through a panel unit-root test. We di-
rectly obtain our data from Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010).
3.3.1 Housing Prices
In this subsection, we use data of housing prices across MSAs to em-
pirically show the following two arguments. The Log of housing prices
follows a random walk process. City fixed effects exist for growth rates
of housing prices.
To remove the potential year fixed effects, we first divide housing
prices of each MSA by the cross-sectional mean in each year. The de-




where pi,t is the real housing price of MSA i in period t, N is the number
of MSAs. To have a consistent testing sample for housing prices and
price-to-rent ratios, we use the balanced sample including 81 MSAs for
8Watson (2009) and Gyourko et al. (2013) address theMSA-level income distribution
problem using the number of families in different income bins. But this method cannot
help us to estimate income growth rates of top income groups in an MSA.
77
the period during 1984-2007.
We perform a unit-root test of housing prices in our balanced panel
of 81 MSAs. Testing unit roots in time series is a common practice nowa-
days, but testing unit roots in panels is still under investigation (Bal-
tagi, 2013). Conventional methods have often been criticised for their
assumption of cross-sectional independence. This is restrictive for our
housing prices which usually exhibit significant cross-sectional correla-
tions among regions.9 Our testing strategy of panel unit roots highly de-
pends on the validity of this assumption. To address this issue, we shall
first conduct a cross-sectional independence test for the Log of housing
prices, and then proceed to a conventional panel unit-root test if the as-
sumption is satisfied, or turn to an alternative test which can account
for the cross-sectional dependence otherwise. In Appendix C.2.1, we
have run several tests, and all the results suggest the existence of cross-
sectional dependence of the Log of housing prices. To tackle this issue,
we conduct the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test against the
null hypothesis that the Log of de-meaned housing prices in each MSA
carries a unit root.10
We allow a maximum of five lags. The CIPS test chooses optimal lags
based on information criteria and generate cross-sectionally augmented
Dickey-Fuller (CADF) statistics for individual groups. The panel test
statistic is a simple average of individual results. The test statistic and
critical values for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels are summarised in
9For example, Levin, Lin and Chu Test, Im-Pesaran-Shin Test, Breitung Test, etc., all
rely on the assumption of cross-sectional dependence.
10Pesaran (2007) develops the CIPS test based on a modified version of the t-bar test
proposed by Im et al. (IPS). The CIPS test is robust for cross-sectional dependent panel
data.
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Table 3.3. We can see that the CIPS test statistic is smaller than the 10%
critical value in absolute terms. Therefore, we shall not reject the null
hypothesis which assumes an existence of panel unit root for all MSAs.
Table 3.3: A Panel Unit-root Test for De-meaned Housing Prices
CIPS Critical Value 10% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 1%
 2.075  2.080  2.160  2.300
Notes: The table presents the statistic of the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS)
test against the null hypothesis that the Log of de-meaned housing prices in each MSA
carries a unit root. The absolute value of the test statistic  2.075 is smaller than that
of the critical value at 10% significance level. Therefore, the result supports the null
hypothesis of an existence of a unit root in the housing price panel.
In addition, we also observe persistent differences in housing price
levels across MSAs, which signal the existence of city fixed effects. This
conjecture can be verified by a joint significance test after running a panel
regression with city fixed effects. The regression equation for de-meaned
housing prices can be specified in the least squares dummy variable
(LSDV) approach and takes the following form,
log qi,t = φ0 + φ1 log qi,t 1 +viMSAi + ei,t, (3.1)
where MSAi is the MSA dummy, i = 1, 2, ...N, and ei,t is the error term.
The panel regression of equation (3.1) yields the estimator bφ1 = 0.94,
which is close to unity.
Rearrangement of equation (3.1) gives us coefficients of MSA dum-
mies, vi, as the difference between an increment of de-meaned house
prices and the constant drift is ∆qi,t   φ0, given the random walk fact
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φ1 = 1. Therefore, vi can be interpreted as time-invariant city fixed ef-
fects of the net growth rate in MSA i. A joint significance test against the
null hypothesis, H0 : v1 = v2 = ... = vN, can be conducted immedi-
ately after running the panel regression of equation (3.1). The Chi-square
statistic is as high as 199.94 and the p-value is virtually zero at four dec-
imal places.11 The joint significance test result confirms the existence
of city fixed effects in housing prices. This result suggests that housing
prices evolve at different speeds across cities.
3.3.2 House Price-to-rent Ratios
In this subsection, we conduct a panel-data unit-root test on house price-
to-rent ratios to show that they follow a random walk process.
Price-to-rent ratios are defined as yi,t  pi,t/di,t, where di,t is the
rental price of MSA i in period t. Although cross-sectional dependence
does not exist for house price-to-rent ratios, we also conduct the CIPS
panel unit-root test for the concern of consistency.12 The null hypothe-
sis of the CIPS panel unit-root test assumes a unit root in price-to-rent
ratios. The test statistic and critical values for 10%, 5%, and 1% signif-
icance levels up to maximum five augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) lags
are summarised in Table 3.4. Due to the small test statistic compared
with these critical values, it is obvious that the Log of price-to-rent ratios
has a unit root and thus they follow a random walk process.
11The Chi-square critical value for 80 degrees of freedom at 1% significance level is
112.33.
12See Appendix C.2.2 for cross-sectional dependence test results of the Log of house
price-to-rent ratios.
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Table 3.4: A Panel Unit-root Test for House Price-to-rent Ratios
CIPS Critical Value 10% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 1%
 2.075  2.080  2.160  2.300
Notes: The table presents the statistic of the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS)
test against the null hypothesis that the Log of price-to-rent ratio in eachMSA carries a
unit root. The absolute value of the test statistic  1.595 is smaller than that of the crit-
ical value at 10% significance level. Therefore, the result supports the null hypothesis
of an existence of a unit root in price-to-rent ratios.
The regression equation for yi,t is also specified in the LSDV form,
log yi,t = δ0 + δ1 log yi,t 1 +ωiMSAi + ξtYeart + εi,t, (3.2)
where MSAi is the MSA dummy, i = 1, 2, ...N, Yeart is the year dummy,
and εi,t is the error term. The panel regression of equation (3.2) yields the
estimator bδ1 = 0.882, which is close to unity.
To test the existence of city fixed effects, a joint significance test against
the null hypothesis, H0 : ω1 = ω2 = ... = ωN, is also conducted. The
Chi-square statistic is as high as 199.78 and the p-value is virtually zero
at four decimal places. This result suggests that city fixed effects exist in
the growth rate of price-to-rent ratios across MSAs.
3.4 An Island Model
We present our theoretical framework in this section. Time is discrete
and infinite with t = 0, 1, 2... The economy is divided into I > 1 seg-
mented islands. Each island is populated with infinitely-lived agents of
measure 1. Agents are not allowed to move across islands. Agents on
all islands share identical preferences. On each island there is an asset-
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pricing problem as in Lucas (1978).
Houses are the only asset in the economy. An agent can only pur-
chase houses on the island where she lives. Each unit of house delivers a
stream of stochastic rents. Let ct denote the consumption in period t and
U (ct) be the period utility function. A representative agent on island i
chooses a sequence of consumption and a sequence of housing units to






where β 2 (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor. The agent’s budget
constraint in period t can be written as
ct + ptst = (pt + dt) st 1, with ct, st > 0,
where st represents the unit of houses purchased, pt is the housing price,
and dt is the stochastic housing rent in period t. The growth rate of
housing rents, xt  log (dt/dt 1), is assumed to follow





where jρj < 1. We assume that each island in our model has one unit of
houses.14
13Since no mobility across islands is allowed, we omit the subscript for island i to
simplify the notation.
14Favara and Song (2014) show that housing prices not only have different trends in
different cities, but also display heterogeneous short-run dynamics. They use a user-
cost model to study how dispersed information affects the equilibrium housing price.
They also assume that housing supply is inelastic in each MSA and agents are not
allowed to move across MSAs. Thus each MSA in their model can also be viewed as a
closed island economy.
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When there is no technology to store housing rents, and the housing
supply is normalised to be 1 in each island, we have ct = dt for all t. The
individual utility function takes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
form, i.e. U (ct) =
(ct)
1 α 1
1 α , where the parameter α > 0 is the coefficient









Let us denote by yt  pt/dt the house price-to-rent ratio in period t.
Together with the definition of xt, equation (3.5) is equivalent to
yt = βEt [(yt+1 + 1) exp [(1  α) xt+1]] . (3.6)
Following Lansing (2010), we let zt  β (yt + 1) exp [(1  α)xt], which is
a composite variable that depends on both the growth rate of rents and
the price-to-rent ratio. Equation (3.6) leads to
zt = β [Et (zt+1) + 1] exp [(1  α)xt] . (3.7)
Equation (3.6) also implies that yt = Et (zt+1).
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3.4.1 The Fundamental Solution
In this subsection, we investigate the fundamental solution of price-to-
rent ratios and its implications for housing prices.



























which is the counterpart of equation (10) in VanNieuwerburgh andWeill
(2010). The fundamental housing price can be completely supported by
rents.
Let z ft be the fundamental solution to equation (3.7), i.e. the solu-
tion satisfying both equation (3.7) and the transversality condition. We
have the following proposition from Lansing (2010) on an approximate
analytical expression of the fundamental solution to equation (3.7):
Proposition 3.1 The fundamental solution to equation (3.7) can be approxi-
mated by











24 β exp [(1  α) x¯]
1  β exp
h





(1  α) x¯+ 12a21σ2ε
i
< 1.
Proof. See Proposition 1 of Lansing (2010).
From Proposition 3.1 we have the fundamental solution of the price-
to-rent ratio,













Formula (3.12) implies that y ft is stationary. In Subsection 3.3.2 we show
that the house price-to-rent ratio process is non-stationary in data. Thus
the fundamental solution of housing prices cannot match data. We will
introduce a non-stationary part to the price-to-rent ratio in the model.
3.4.2 Rational Bubble Solutions
The fundamental solution to equation (3.7), z ft , satisfies the transversal-
ity condition. There are other solutions to equation (3.7) which do not
satisfy the transversality condition.











exp [(1  α) xt] . (3.14)
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t , satisfies equation
(3.6). The following proposition can be obtained from Lansing (2010).




t 1 exp [λ0 + λ1 (xt   x¯) + λ2 (xt 1   x¯)] , with zb0 > 0,
where λ0, λ1, and λ2 satisfies the following two conditions,






ε + (1  α) x¯+ log (β) + λ0 = 0. (3.16)
Proof. See Proposition 2 of Lansing (2010).
We have multiple equilibria since we have three unknowns λ0, λ1,
and λ2 for equations (3.15) and (3.16).
The equations above have two roots of λ1. The solutionwith negative
λ0 will eventually shrink to zero, while the solution with positive drift
implies the price-to-rent ratio will grow unboundedly.
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We thus have the bubble component of the price-to-rent ratio,
ybt = y
b
t 1 exp [λ0 + (λ1   (1  α)) (xt   x¯) + (λ2 + 1  α) (xt 1   x¯)] ,
with yb0 > 0. (3.17)







can easily generate an increasing dispersion. This is the key mechanism,
through which our model could match the rapid growth in the disper-
sion of housing prices. Through calibrating the model, we illustrate this
mechanism in Subsection 3.5.3. Even after we pick values for λ0, λ1, and
λ2 in formula (3.17), we still need finding the initial yb0. In our quantita-
tive analyses, we calibrate yb0 for each MSA from data.
3.5 Quantitative Analyses
In this section, we calculate housing prices in the island economy. Each
island corresponds to an MSA. We intend to investigate whether our
model can generate the rapid growth in the dispersion of housing prices.
In the following, we first discuss parameterizations and calibration strate-
gies. After we calculate housing prices with only the fundamental solu-




The model is calibrated to the housing market in the United States dur-
ing 1975-2007. Each period in the model corresponds to one year in data.
The time discount factor, β, generally lies in the interval [0.95, 0.99] in the
literature. We set it to 0.97. We set the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
α, to 1.2, which is also within the reasonable range in existing studies.15
The rental growth rate process is specified in equation (3.3). In order
to estimate x¯, ρ, and σε, we propose the following regression for our
balanced panel of 81 MSAs during 1985-2007,
xi,t = co + ρxi,t 1 + εi,t, εi,t  N(0, σ2ε ). (3.18)
We denote by ρˆ the estimated autocorrelation coefficient, and by cˆo the
estimated constant term. We find that city fixed effects do not exist re-
gardless of whether we include year-fixed effects into equation (3.18).
Specifically, we first add city dummies to equation (3.18) and run the
LSDV panel regression. We then add city dummies and year dummies
simultaneously to equation (3.18). Joint tests of city dummies in both
specifications show that we should accept the null hypothesis that city
fixed effects do not exist.16 Thus in our specification (3.18) co does not
depend on i, and our estimate of x¯ is equal to cˆo/(1  ρˆ). The estimation
result yields bρ = 0.132, which is statistically significantly different from
zero. And a panel unit-root test shows that fxi,tg is stationary.17
15The quantitative results are fairly robust when we try different combinations of α
and β.
16See Appendix C.2.3 for details of test results.
17The null hypothesis of the panel unit-root test is that rental growth rates have a unit
root. The test result rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. Appendix


























































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Rental Price Distributions: 1984-2007
We summarise our parameter values in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Benchmark Parameterizations
Model Parameter Value
Time discount factor β 0.97
Risk aversion coefficient α 1.2
Mean of x x¯ 0.00369
Standard deviation of the error term σε 0.0408
The theoretical framework enables us to calculate price-to-rent ratios.
In order to obtain corresponding housing prices, we need to input rental
prices. However, due to the limited availability of rental price data, we
estimate rental prices during 1975-1983.
In Figure 3.3, we present a snapshot of the kernel density for rental
price data during 1984-2007.
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The pattern suggests a log-normal distribution of rental prices across
MSAs, but with potentially different means and variances over time.
Therefore, we assume that rental prices in year 1974 and year 1975 fol-
low a joint log-normal distribution lnN(µ,Σ), where µ = [µ1, µ2] de-
notes average rental prices in 1974 and in 1975 respectively. Σ is the cor-
responding variance-covariance matrix, whose diagonal elements rep-
resent variances of rental prices in 1974 (σ21) and in 1975 (σ
2
2) respec-
tively. The off-diagonal element (σ12) captures the correlation between
rental prices in 1974 and those in 1975. We jointly estimate the value
of fµ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, σ12g to minimise the distance between means and vari-
ances of simulated rental prices during 1984-2007 and their counterparts
in data. We report estimated parameter values in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: SMM Estimation Results
Model Parameter Value
Average rent 1974 µ1 3.81
Average rent 1975 µ2 5.53
Variance of rent 1974 σ1 0.016
Variance of rent 1975 σ2 0.025
Correlation between 1974 and 1975 rents ρ12 0.99
We randomly draw rental prices of 81 MSAs in year 1974 and in year
1975 from the log-normal distribution specified in Table 3.6. These en-
able us to compute the initial rental price growth rate for each MSA in
1975. Given the initial distribution fxi,0g, we can then simulate a panel
of fxi,tg during 1976-1984 using equation (3.18). Then we can back out
rental prices during 1976-1984. However, our simulated rental prices
during 1975-1984 are "anonymous." In order to connect the simulated
house price to the housing price in each MSA, we label simulated rental
prices such that simulated rental prices in 1984 obey the same rank as
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they do in the 1984 data.
3.5.2 The Fundamental Solution and Excessive Disper-
sion
We first simulate fundamental housing prices for each MSA. As in Sec-
tion 3.4.1, we can approximate the fundamental solution of the price-to-
rent ratio using (3.12). We determine values of a1 and a0 by formulae
(3.10) and (3.11). Given our benchmark parameterization, a1 =  0.23
and a0 = 3.45. After we obtain housing prices for 81 MSAs, we can cal-
culate the cross-sectional mean and CV of housing prices for each year
during 1975-2007. In Figure 3.4, we plot the mean and the CV of the
simulated fundamental housing prices and their counterparts in data.
As depicted in Figure 3.4, simulated fundamental housing prices fail
to match either the mean or the CV in data. Fundamental housing prices
cannot replicate the rapid increase in the dispersion of housing prices
across MSAs.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.4 also shows that the cross-sectional CV of hous-
ing prices is larger than that of housing prices implied by the fundamen-
tal solution for each year during 1975-2007. Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and
Porter (1981) show that time series of shock prices exhibit excess volatil-
ity, i.e. the CV of time series of stock prices is larger than the CV of
the expected present value of future real dividends. Bulkley et al. (1996)
study the cross-sectional dispersion of individual company share prices.
They find that stock prices of a large sample of firms in the United States
are excessively dispersed compared with ex post rational stock prices
calculated from subsequent dividend realizations. Through our calcu-
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Panel A CV: Fundamental Housing Prices v.s. Data














Panel B Mean: Fundamental Housing Prices v.s. Data















Figure 3.4: Fundamental Housing Prices
Notes: We approximate the analytical solution for the fundamental price-to-rental ratio
according to (3.12) discussed in Section 3.4.1. We obtain the housing price series by
multiplying the price-to-rental ratio by the corresponding rental price level in each
MSA. For more details, please refer to Section 3.4.1 and the texts.
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lations, we find excessive dispersion for housing prices in the United
States.
3.5.3 Results with a Rational Bubble
In Section 3.5.2 we find that fundamental housing prices cannot match
the rapid rise in the dispersion of housing prices across MSAs. Then we
add a bubble component to the house price-to-rent ratio. Thus we have






for i = 1, 2,    I.





in Section 3.5.2. Using equation (3.17) we calculate the





(3.17) we need to know λ0, λ1, and λ2. We pin down λ1 and λ2 from
equations (3.15) and (3.16). We calibrate the drift term λ0 to minimise
the distance between the average growth rate of housing prices in the
























where pdi,t is the housing price in MSA i at time t in data and p
m
i,t is the
corresponding housing price in the model. We find λ0 = 0.030, λ1 =
1.305, and λ2 = 0.028.
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Using equation (3.12) we can calculate the initial value of the funda-
mental component of the price-to-rent ratio, y fi,0, for each MSA. Then the
initial value of the bubble component of the price-to-rent ratio, ybi,0, is
determined by
ybi,0 = yi,0   y fi,0,
where yi,0 is the house price-to-rent ratio in year 1975 in data.
After we calculate yi,t, we then multiply yi,t with its corresponding
rental price, to generate the housing price. To calculate the cross-sectional
mean and CV of housing prices, we assign an equal weight to each MSA
for benchmark results. But the results are fairly robust when we use
housing units as weights. In Figure 3.5, we plot benchmark results to-
gether with their counterparts in data.
Evidently, our calculated series of the mean and the CV of housing
prices match data well. When we use the CV to measure the dispersion
of housing prices, data show a rapid increase in the CV of housing prices
during 1975-2007. The CV in data increases from 0.17 in 1975 to 0.55 in
2007. Our model predicts that the CV rises from 0.17 in 1975 to 0.67
in 2007. In 1975 our model has the same CV as in data since we use
housing prices in 1975 in data as initial housing prices in our model.
We are successful in predicting the rapid increase in the CV of housing
prices during this period.
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Panel A CV: Model v.s. Data














Panel B Mean: Model v.s. Data


















Figure 3.5: Benchmark Results of Housing Prices: 1975-2007
Notes: Our calculations incorporate a balanced panel of 81 MSAs. Housing prices are
plotted during 1975-2007. We apply true rental price data during 1984-2007, and use




In this section, we perform several robustness exercises. Firstly, we eval-
uate how well our model can match data after 1985, when we do not
need to perform any estimation of rental prices. Secondly, we also sim-
ulate housing prices using the entire simulated rental prices, while we
use actual rental data after 1985 in the benchmark simulation. Finally,
we try to produce housing prices for the unbalanced panel of 330 MSAs.
We find that our results are robust for all these alternatives.
Calculations during 1985-2007
We estimate rental prices during 1975-1983 in the benchmark simulation,
because we do not have rental data for that period. To make sure that
our results are not driven by the estimation strategy, we now only calcu-
late housing prices using rental prices from data without any estimation.
As rental data are available after 1984, we calculate housing prices after
1985, when we can obtain initial rental growth rates, fxi0g.18 We calcu-




i,t for i = 1, 2,    I and
t = 1985, 1986,    2007. Then we multiply fyi,tg with the corresponding
rental price in each MSA to obtain the housing price. Results are pre-
sented in Figure 3.6. The CV in data increases from 0.33 in 1985 to 0.55
in 2007. Our model predicts that the CV rises from 0.33 in 1985 to 0.54
in 2007.19 We also replicate the rapid rise in the CV of housing prices
during this period.
18We use the value of λ0 as in our benchmark simulation. There λ0 is calibrated to
minimise the distance between the average growth rate of housing prices in the model
and their counterparts in data during 1985-2007.
19In 1985 our model has the same CV as in data since we use housing prices in 1985
in data as initial housing prices in robustness exercise.
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Panel A CV: Model Housing Prices v.s. Data












Panel B Mean: Model Housing Prices v.s. Data


















Figure 3.6: Robustness Results: 1985-2007 without Estimations
Notes: We directly calculate the house price-to-rent ratio, and then obtain the housing
price by multiplying it with the rental price of each MSA. Data of rental prices are
available since 1984. Thus we do not need to perform estimations after 1985. The
y-axis of panel (b) is in the logarithm scale.
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Purely Simulated Rental Prices
In our benchmark simulation, we use actual rental price data after 1985.
Since rental prices are important inputs for our simulations, we now in-
ject the entire simulated rental price panel into the economy instead, and
evaluate how estimation results may vary accordingly. Results are re-
ported in Figure 3.7. The CV in data increases from 0.17 in 1975 to 0.55
in 2007. Our model predicts that the CV rises from 0.17 in 1975 to 0.74
in 2007. We also generate the rapid growth in the CV of housing prices
during this period.
An Unbalanced Panel
We also extend our analysis to the unbalanced panel of 330 MSAs. We
re-estimate equation (3.18) for the rental growth rate process, fxi,tg, in
the unbalanced panel. The estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient, ρ,
now is 0.059. The estimate of the average rental growth rate, x¯, now is
0.147%. And the estimate of the standard deviation of the error term, σε,
now is 0.042. As in Section 3.4.2, we find values for λ0, λ1, and λ2 for 330
MSAs. Now λ0 = 0.030, λ1 = 0.633, and λ2 = 0.163. We then replicate
housing prices in the unbalanced panel of 330 MSAs. Simulation results
are reported in Figure 3.8. The CV in data increases from 0.17 in 1975 to
0.56 in 2007. Our model predicts that the CV rises from 0.17 in 1975 to
0.51 in 2007. We also produce the rapid rise in the CV of housing prices
during this period.
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Panel A CV: Model Housing Prices v.s. Data














Panel B Mean: Model Housing Prices v.s. Data


















Figure 3.7: Robustness Results: All Rental Prices are Simulated
Notes: In this robustness check, the entire sequence of rental prices during 1975-2007
is from simulations. The y-axis of panel (b) is in the logarithm scale.
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Panel A CV: Model v.s. Data















Panel B Mean: Fundamental Housing Prices v.s. Data


















Figure 3.8: Robustness Results: an Unbalanced Panel
Notes: We re-estimate the process fxi,tg for 330 MSAs, and then replicate housing
prices of the unbalanced panel. The y-axis of panel (b) is in the logarithm scale.
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3.6 An Extension: Sunspot and Bubble Burst
It is widely documented that the incidence of the 2007 global financial
crisis was caused by the burst of housing bubbles in the United States. It
seems that there are different regimes of housing price dynamics. Since
the price-to-ratio has a stochastic growth component in our benchmark
model, and thus it eventually leads to explosive dispersion of housing
prices. In this section, we present an extension of the benchmark model.
In the extension, bubbles eventually burst in the long-run. But before
bubbles burst, there is a rapid growth in the dispersion of housing prices.
To model regime switching of housing price dynamics, we introduce
an extrinsic uncertainty into our benchmark model. Kashiwagi (2014)
finds a rational expectations sunspot equilibrium in a model based on
search and matching theory. His model can generate a stable path of
rental prices and a rapid growth of housing prices. However, he does
not investigate the implication of a sunspot equilibrium on the cross-
sectional dispersion of housing prices. As in Kashiwagi (2014), the ex-
trinsic uncertainty in our model represents the confidence state, which
could be either the high (H) state or the low (L) state. This sunspot event
is unrelated to fundamentals of the economy.
Equations (3.15) and (3.16) are two key equations generating the price-
to-rent ratio in our rational bubble economy. We need these two equa-
tions to pin down three parameters fλ0,λ1,λ2g, and this allows us one
degree of freedom. In quantitative analyses of our benchmark model,
we calibrate λ0. In this section, we instead let the parameter λ0 take
four possible values, which depend on confidence states of the current
and the next period. We denote by λij0 (i, j 2 fH, Lg) these four values.
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Superscripts of λij0 mean that the confidence state in the current period
is i and the confidence state in the next period is j. We also denote by
ψt the confidence state in period t. Let z
b
t (ψt) represent z
b
t in the confi-
dence state ψt. Let θ  1  α. The following proposition characterises
the sunspot equilibrium.






λHH0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)

, if ψt = H
zbt (H) exp

λHL0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)








λHL0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)

, if ψt = H
zbt (L) exp

λLL0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)

, if ψt = L.
The confidence state follows a Markov process, and piij represents the transition
probability from the state i in the current period to the state j in the next period.
Constants λHH0 > 0, λ
HL
0 < 0, λ
LL
0 < 0, λ
LH
0 >> 0, λ1, λ2, piHH, piHL, piLL,
and piLH satisfy





































piHH + piHL = 1, (3.22)
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and
piLL + piLH = 1. (3.23)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.












where z ft is given by equation (3.9).
Introducing a sunspot event into the benchmark model, we greatly
expand our degree of freedom. In total we have ten unknowns and five









































This could help us to generate a scenario of bubble burst.
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We illustrate a scenario of bubble burst in a simple numerical exer-








Then we solve λLH0 , λ
HL
0 and λ2 from equations (3.19), (3.20), and
(3.21). We concentrate on the sample of 81 MSAs here. The initial year
is still 1975. The process of the rental price growth rate and initial rental
price distributions are the same as in quantitative analyses of the bench-
mark model. Moreover, we set confidence states of all 81 MSAs in 1975
to the state L. In each year after 1975, different MSAs may have differ-
ent realizations of confidence states, even though the confidence state
in each MSA follows the same Markov process. We simulate the model
economy for 1, 000 periods. Through simulations, we calculate the cross-
sectional mean and CV of housing prices. These are reported in Figure
3.9.
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Panel A CV: Sunspot















Panel B Mean: Sunspot















Figure 3.9: Simulations of a Sunspot Equilibrium
Notes: We simulate sunspot events for 81 MSAs from year 1975. The confidence states
of all 81 MSAs in 1975 are set as L, but may have different realizations afterwards even
if they follow the same Markov process. We simulate the model economy for 1,000
periods. The y-axis of panel (b) is in the logarithm scale.
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3.7 Conclusion
We investigate the rapid growth in the dispersion of housing prices across
MSAs in the United States during 1975-2007. We first examine several
intuitively plausible explanations for this pattern, and find that it is dif-
ficult to fully explain it.
We then conduct econometric analyses of panel data. We empirically
show that housing prices are non-stationary. And we find that the Log
of house price-to-rent ratios follows a random walk process through a
panel unit-root test.
To investigate further the rapid growth in the dispersion of housing
prices, we set up a parsimonious asset-pricing island model. Each island
corresponds to an MSA. We first study the fundamental solution of the
asset pricing model. Our calculations show that the cross-sectional CV
of housing prices is larger than that of housing prices implied by the fun-
damental solution for each year during 1975-2007. Housing prices in the
United States display excessive dispersion. Also we find that the growth
in the dispersion of fundamental housing prices is too slow relative to
the pattern in data. Incorporating rational bubble solutions, our cali-
brated model can simultaneously match four stylised facts in the United
States during 1975-2007, the rapid growth in the dispersion of housing
prices, the moderate increase in the dispersion of rental prices, the rising
mean of housing prices, and the rising mean of rental prices.
One of the important mechanisms that we do not take into account
explicitly in this chapter is the credit channel of houses. Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) show that collateral channel of assets could amplify the
volatility of their prices. Brumm et al. (2015) find that borrowing against
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collateral substantially increases the return volatility of long-lived assets.
Gelain et al. (2015) investigate different impacts of shifting lending stan-
dards and movements in the mortgage interest rate, on the boom-bust
cycle of the housing market in the United States during 1995-2012. Fav-
ilukis et al. (2016) find that a relaxation of financing constraints leads
to a large boom in house prices. We could follow these researches to
investigate the implication of the credit channel on the cross-sectional
dispersion of housing prices. We leave this for our future research.
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Proofs of Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1. The solution of equation (1.27) is given by its
recursive representation:






To show that equation (1.27) has a unique stationary solution, we
invoke Theorem A and Theorem B of Kesten(1973). We need to verify
following conditions:
(i) eρ1,eρ2, ...,eρn are independent two-dimensional matrices each with
the same distribution;
(ii) P feρ1  0g = 1, Pfeρ1 has a zero rowg = 0,and E log+ keρ1k < ∞;













keρ1eρ2...eρnk = limn!∞1n jxeρ1eρ2...eρnj > 0.
Since eηt is i.i.d and follows the same distribution, eρ1,eρ2, ...,eρn are in-
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dependent two-dimensional matrices each with the same distribution by
construction.
Since all parameters are positive, δh 2 (0, 1), tax rates τw, τr, τb 2
[0, 1], the random term eη1 > 0 if it follows a log-normal distribution, ma-
trix eρ1 is non-negativewith no zero row. E log+ keρ1k = Emax(0, log keρ1k) =
E log keρ1k > 0. Condition (ii) follows naturally.
Since the stochastic difference equation (1.27) satisfies the condition
in Theorem 2 of Furstenberg and Kesten (1960), i.e.,







Appendices of Chapter 2
B.1 The Data Source
The China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) is conducted by the Sur-
vey and Research Center for ChinaHousehold Finance in the Southwest-
ern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE). This survey pro-
vides detailed information about household assets in China, including
housing, business assets, financial assets, and other household assets. In
addition, the survey has information on income, expenditure, and social
and commercial insurances.
The sampling design of CHFS consists of two major components: an
overall sampling scheme and an on-site sampling scheme based onmap-
ping. The overall sample scheme employs a stratified three-stage proba-
bility proportion to size (PPS) random sample design. The primary sam-
pling units (PSU) include 2, 585 counties (including county-level cities
and districts) from all provinces (including province-level municipalities
and province-level autonomous region) in China except Tibet, Xinjiang,
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Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The second stage of
sampling involves selecting communities from the counties selected in
the earlier stage, as well as households from each residential commu-
nity. In practice, the 2011 CHFS selected 80 counties from the PSU, then
four residential communities from each county, and then 20  50 house-
holds from each residential community depending on level of urbaniza-
tion and economic development. Communities with high housing prices
are oversampled.
The first wave of the survey was conducted in the summer of 2011,
collected earnings and income information in 2010. The sample size is
8, 438 households and 29, 500 individuals from 25 provinces. Geographic
coverage is almost the entire mainland China, except Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, Tibet, Hainan, Ningxia, and Fujian. The final ratio of urban
to rural communities was 187 : 139. The overall refusal rate, 11.6%, is
considered low among households surveys worldwide.
For more information about the CHFS dataset, see Gan et al. (2014)
and the website http://www.chfsdata.org/
B.2 Definitions of Variables
We follow Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997), Budría et al. (2002), and Díaz-
Giménez et al. (2011) to define earnings, income, and wealth. The origi-
nal lists have been modified to fit the distinctive characteristics in China
(e.g. the social security account).
Earnings. We define labor earnings as wages and salaries of all kinds
plus a fraction of business income (for entrepreneurial labor). Business
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income includes income from farm and business sources. According to
Li (2012), the value for the fraction is imputed as 84% for income from
farm sources and 59% for income from business sources.
Income. Income is defined as all kinds of revenue before taxes, in-
cluding both government and private transfers. We classify the sources
of income into the following five categories. Labor income: wages and
salaries. Capital income: interest income, dividends, gains or losses from
the sale of stocks, bonds, mutual funds, derivatives, gold, real estate, and
other financial assets; rent (of housing, land, and vehicle), trust income,
and royalties from any other investment or business. Business income:
income from businesses and farm sources. Transfers: private transfers;
unemployment and worker compensation, monetary and in-kind sub-
sidy for agricultural production, and other forms of welfare and assis-
tance. Other income: income from Social Security and other pensions,
annuities, compensation for disabilities, and retirement programs; and
income from all other sources including compensation for requisition of
land/housing, settlements, prizes, scholarships and grants, inheritances,
gifts, insurance claim, and so on. Note that income does not include im-
puted income from the services of some assets such as owner-occupied
housing.
Wealth. Wealth is defined as the net worth of households, which
includes the value of financial and real assets of all kinds net of various
kinds of debts: Residences and other real estate; farms and all other busi-
nesses; checking accounts, and other banking accounts; mutual funds,
bonds and stocks, cash and call money at the stock brokerage, deriva-
tives, gold, all annuities, trusts, and managed investment accounts; ma-
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jor consumer durables, collections, and luxuries; vehicles; the cash value
of term and life insurance policies and other policies; money owed by
friends, relatives, businesses, and others; pension plans accumulated in
social security and other accounts; and other assets.1
B.3 Estimation of the Cash Value of Life Insur-
ance Policies
B.3.1 Estimation of Net Level Premium Reserves
We estimate the cash value of life insurance policies using the concept
of net level premium reserve (NLPR), which is the balance between ex-
pected present value of amounts to be paid into and out of the insurer
under the policy. There are two approaches to compute net level pre-
mium reserve, the retrospective reserve and prospective reserve. The
retrospective reserve represents the net premiums collected by the in-
surer at age α in period t for a particular block of policies, plus interest






where Cs and Bs denote the premium payments and death benefits re-
spectively. The prospective reserve is the difference between the present
value of future benefits and the present value of future net premiums.
The Recursive formulae for prospective reserve requires forecasting of
mortality rates for each age in each future year. The forecasting method
1See Appendix B.3 for estimation of the cash value of life insurance policies.
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is presented briefly in Appendix B.3.2. Given mortality rates q, prospec-
tive reserves can be computed as follows:
Terminal age Ω : VΩ =  CΩ + Death Benefits1+ r ,
Every other age α : Vα,t =  Cα + EBα,t




Both retrospective and prospective approaches will produce the same
level of reserves at the end of any given year under the same actuarial
assumptions. To better utilize the 2011 CHFS information and to account
for the life contingency, we adopt the prospective approach for estima-
tion of the net level premium reserve.
The choice of discount rate is not essential in our estimating results,
because the average size of estimated net premium reserve is negligible
in household wealth. The impact of various discount rates on household
wealth and distributions are summarized in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Discount Rates and Household Wealth
Discount	rate Mean	of	Household	Life	Insurance	Wealth	(2010	RMB) Mean	of	Total	Household	Wealth(2010	RMB)
Share	of	Life	Insurance	Wealth	in	Total	Household	Wealth Gini	Coefficient	of	Wealth*0% 7,533.56 692,657.30 1.09% 0.760571% 3,806.60 688,930.30 0.55% 0.76058
2% 1,937.59 687,061.30 0.28% 0.760633% 1,009.87 686,133.60 0.15% 0.760664% 545.10 685,668.80 0.08% 0.760685% 303.73 685,427.40 0.04% 0.76070*Notes:	rounding	to	5	decimal	points	to	see	the	impacts	of	discount	rate	on	Gini	coefficient	of	wealth.
123
B.3.2 Projection of Mortality Rates
We employ Lee-Carter (1992) model to estimate and forecast all-cause
mortality for Chinese population from year 2010 onwards. Due to in-
sufficient availability of historical life tables for Chinese population, we
use Hong Kong Yearly Life Table 1971–2013 as an alternative source of
estimation. We match the life table of China in 2010 by life table of Hong
Kong in 1980 due to the likeness of life expectancy for both male and
female.
According to Fries Hypothesis (Fries, 1980), the maximum potential
life expectancy is normally distributed throughout the population, with
a mean of 85 and a standard deviation of 7 years. We therefore assume
a flat mortality rates thereafter when the implied life expectancy upon
birth reaches 85 years for male and female separately.
B.4 Land Value Imputation
Strictly speaking, land in China is not defined as a private asset which
is freely tradable. Farmers possess land-use rights but not land owner-
ship. Rural land is used as an important factor of production for farm-
ers, who usually receive compensation during land acquisition by the
government. The rural land (leasing) markets have been developing
rapidly since the adoption of the Rural Land Contracting Law in 2003
(Naughton, 2007). We use following procedures to impute the shadow
price of local land in the 2011 CHFS survey:
1. Discard self-reported land values above 20 million RMB.
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2. Classify land types as farming land, residential land, state-owned
land, and others.
3. Standardize the land unit as mu (a Chinese unit of area, 1 mu=
0.0667 hectares= 666.67 square meters).
4. Compute the unit price of each piece of land.
5. For each type of land, impute the top 5% and bottom 5% unit land
prices in the rural area by their local median values; and impute
the top 5% and bottom 5% unit land price in the urban area by the
national median value.
6. Compute the imputed land asset value by multiplying imputed
unit land prices by land area.
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Appendix C
Appendices of Chapter 3
C.1 Data Sources and Definitions
Metropolitan statistical area (MSA): The metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) in the chapter is based on 2006 MSA definitions. To account for
size differences among MSAs, we follow Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill
(2010) to replace 11 largest MSAs with their constituent metropolitan di-
visions (MSAD). Our primary sample consists of 81 MSAs from 1975 to
2007. We include 330 MSAs with unbalanced housing prices in an ex-
tended sample for quantitative analyses. The 81 MSAs in the balanced
panel are listed in Table C.1.1 An overview of those MSAs in our bal-
anced and unbalanced panel is presented in Figure C.1.
Notes: Regions in dark blue represent MSAs in the balanced panel. Regions in dark
and light blue represent MSAs in the unbalanced panel. Regions in red are MSAs not
included in our sample.
Housing prices: We obtain housing prices data directly from Van
Nieuwerburgh andWeill (2010). The nominal home value at eachMSA is
1330 MSAs in the unbalanced panel sample are listed in a separate spreadsheet.
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Figure C.1: MSAs in Our Balanced and Unbalanced Panel
constructed by combining themedian single-family home value from the
2000 Census with the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price
Index (CMHPI), a repeated-sale housing price index available from 1975
to 2007. In 1975, CMHPI data are only available in 81 MSAs. Data for
more and more MSAs have become available over time.2 After 1996, all
330 MSAs have balanced housing price data. The nominal home value is
deflated into the constant 1975 dollar by a regional cost-of-living index
(COLI) which excludes shelter. The COLI data are also taken from Van
Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010).
Rental prices: We take rental data directly from Van Nieuwerburgh and
Weill (2010) using the Fair Market Rents database (FMR), published an-
nually by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD). Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) aggregate nominal
rents to the MSA level using population-weighted averages and adjust
for the fact that the reported rent percentile changes over time. Similar
2See Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) Appendix D.3 for details.
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to home prices, real rents are obtained by deflating nominal rents by re-
gional non-housing price index. Rental data in all MSAs are available
from 1984 to 2007.
Population: The 2010 Census of Population and Housing published by
the United States Census Bureau releases all five waves of population
data from 1970 to 2010 at the county level. We collect and aggregate
them up into the MSA level according to the 2006 MSA definition.
Housing units: The 2010 Census of Population and Housing published
by the United States Census Bureau releases all five waves of housing
unit data from 1970 to 2010 at the county level. We collect and aggregate
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.2 Empirical Analyses and Tests
C.2.1 Cross-sectional Dependence Tests for the Log ofDe-
meaned Housing Prices
The cross-sectional dependence tests of panel data include the Pesaran
model, the Friedman model, and the Frees model with the same null
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. We conduct above cross-
sectional dependence tests for de-meaned housing prices immediately
after the running the regression of equation (3.1). The test results are
listed in Table C.2.
Table C.2: Cross-sectional Dependence Tests for De-meaned Housing
Prices
Pesaran Friedman Frees
Test Statistics 5.995 139.857 9.072
p-value 0.0000 0.0000  
Notes: The table presents the Pesaran, the Friedman, and the Frees tests of cross-
sectional dependence. The small p-values suggest a strong existence of cross-sectional
dependence of de-meaned housing prices.
In addition, the average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements
in the cross-sectional correlation matrix of residuals is 0.303, which is
considered quite high. Therefore, there are enough evidences suggesting
the presence of cross-sectional dependence among the Log of de-meaned
housing prices under a LSDV specification. It hints us to proceed the
unit-root test which can account for cross-sectional dependence of panel
data.
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C.2.2 Cross-sectional Dependence Tests for the Log of Price-
to-rent Ratios
Proceeding as de-meaned housing prices, we conduct tests of cross-sectional
dependence, panel-data unit-root, and city fixed effects for price-to-rent
ratio, yi,t. We conduct the cross-sectional dependence tests immediately
after the regression of equation (3.2). The test results are listed in Table
C.3.
Table C.3: Cross-sectional Dependence Tests for Price-to-Rent Ratio
Pesaran Friedman Frees
Test Statistics  1.719 19.848 6.461
p-value 1.9144 1.0000  
Notes: The first column of the table presents the estimator of bρ1 in equation (C.1) andbρ2 in equation (C.2). Since both estimators of autocorrelation are less than unity, the
process of rental growth rates under both specifications are stationary. The second and
third column presents Chi-square statistics and p-values of the joint-significance test
for city-fixed effects. These results do not support an existence of city-fixed effects in
rental growth rates.
Large p-values suggest a cross-sectional independence among the
Log of price-to-rent ratios under a LSDV specification. For the concern
of consistency, we can still proceed with CIPS panel unit-root test which
is robust for panels with cross-sectional dependence.
C.2.3 The City Fixed-effect Test for Rental Growth Rates
The estimation equation (3.18) is pinned down after attempts on the re-
gressions with year-fixed effects and city fixed effects. The regression
equation accounting for city fixed effects is
xi,t = co + ρ0xi,t 1 + γiMSAi + νi,t, νi,t  N(0, σ2ε ). (C.1)
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Similarly, the regression equation accounting for year-fixed effects is
xi,t = c1 + ρ1xi,t 1 + ηiMSAi + ζtYeart + ei,t, ei,t  N(0, σ2ε ). (C.2)
Above regressions yield estimators of autocorrelation, bρ0 and bρ1, and
city fixed effects for 81 MSAs, bγi and bηi, i = 1, ..., 81. bγi and bηi for 81
MSAs varies in signs and significance levels. Due to the space constraint,
we do not report their values in this appendix.
To test the existence of city fixed effects in the de-meaned housing
prices, we shall conduct a joint significance test against the null hypoth-
esis: H0 : γ1 = γ2 = ... = γN for equation (C.1) and H0 : η1 = η2 = ... =
ηN for equation (C.2).
The estimated autocorrelation terms and key statistics of joint signif-
icance tests for above two specifications are summarised in Table C.4.
Table C.4: Estimations and Tests of City-fixed Effects
Regression Equation bρ Chi-square Statistics p-value
(1) (2) (3)
(C.1) 0.122 22.06 1.0000
(C.2) 0.044 28.78 1.0000
Notes: The table presents the Pesaran, the Friedman, and the Frees tests of cross-
sectional dependence. The large p-values suggest a non-existence of cross-sectional
dependence of price-to-rent ratios.
The Chi-square test statistics are 26.97 and 31.11, both are far below
the critical value at 5% significance level with 80 degrees of freedom,
101.88. The p-values are approximately an unity at four decimal places.
The null hypotheses are thus rejected, and we can conclude that city
fixed effects do not exist regardless of whether we add year-fixed effects
into equation (3.18).
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C.2.4 Cross-sectional Dependence Tests and the Panel Unit-
root Test for Rental Growth Rates
Applying the same rational and methodology, we test the stationarity
of rental growth rates, xi,t. We shall first conduct cross-sectional depen-
dence test of xi,t, and then choose appropriate panel unit-root test ac-
cording the test results of the former. In addition, we also present the
joint significance test of city fixed effects and equality tests of long-run
means across cities.
We again conduct cross-sectional dependence tests after running the
regression of equation (3.18). The test results using the Pesaran model,
the Friedman model, and the Frees model are listed in Table C.5.
Table C.5: Cross-sectional Dependence Tests for Rental Growth Rates
Pesaran Friedman Frees
Test Statistics 39.254 471.573 5.808
p-value 0.0000 0.0000  
Notes: The table presents the Pesaran, the Friedman, and the Frees tests of cross-
sectional dependence. The small p-values suggest an existence of cross-sectional de-
pendence of rental growth rates.
The average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements in the cross-
sectional correlationmatrix of residuals ismoderately high at 0.233. There-
fore, above evidences suggest the presence of cross-sectional dependence
among rental growth rates.
We conduct the same CIPS test for rental growth rates as in the sec-
tion for de-meaned housing prices and price-to-rent ratios. The null hy-
pothesis of this test assumes that all panels are non-stationary (carrying
unit roots). The CIPS test statistic and critical values for 10%, 5%, and
1% significance levels up to five ADF lag terms are listed in Table C.6.
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The strong stationarity of rental growth rates is supported by the large
absolute test statistic compared with the three critical values.
Table C.6: A Panel Unit-root Test for Rental Growth Rates
CIPS Critical Value 10% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 1%
 4.384  2.080  2.160  2.300
Notes: The table presents the statistic of the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS)
test against the null hypothesis that rental growth rates in each MSA carry a unit root.
The absolute value of test statistic  4.384 is larger than that of the critical value at
1% significance level. Therefore, the result rejects the null hypothesis and concludes a
non-existence of a unit root in rental growth rates.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3







λHH0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)

, if ψt = H
zbt (L) exp

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λHL0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)

, if ψt = H
zbt (L) exp

λLL0 + λ1 (xt+1   x¯) + λ2 (xt   x¯)

, if ψt = L,
which depends on the state of the economy in the previous period.
Thus we have
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for ψt = H.
Thus
zbt (L) = βe
θxt







zbt (H) = βe
θxt
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These establish the proof.
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